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ABSTRACT
The year 2018 has witnessed widespread celebrations of the life and
legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was assassinated fifty years
ago in Memphis, Tennessee. Yet if Dr. King were alive today, he would
no doubt be dismayed by the path taken by the Supreme Court’s
treatment of race-related issues in recent years. Not only has the Court
abandoned the quest for school desegregation, but the 2013 decision in
Shelby County v. Holder substantially reduced the effectiveness of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was the most important legislative
monument to Dr. King’s efforts.
By contrast, these developments would no doubt have pleased
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a harsh critic of Dr. King who joined the Supreme
Court less than four years after King’s death. Prior to taking his seat on
the Court, Powell had been openly critical of the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, and in his capacity as chair of the school board of
Richmond, Virginia, had worked ceaselessly to limit the pace and scope
of the desegregation of the Richmond schools. Moreover, even before
joining the Court, he had actively sought to limit the impact of the
Voting Rights Act on the decision-making authority of state and local
governments in the South. Similarly, in the cases that came before him
after coming to the Court, Powell consistently voted to limit the scope
of remedial orders in desegregation cases and argued that the
Constitution imposed important limits on the scope of congressional
authority to deal with the issues that the Voting Rights Act was designed
to address.
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Powell had only limited success in persuading a majority of his
colleagues to support him on these issues. However, the reasoning of the
Court’s decisions in the years after Powell left the Court in 1987 has
often embraced the arguments made by Powell during his tenure as a
justice. This article not only explores Powell’s background and
jurisprudence, but also provides the first scholarly discussion of the
relationship between his views and the positions currently taken by the
Court.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s attitude toward issues involving school
desegregation and voting rights has changed significantly in recent
years. During the period between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s, a
majority of the justices embraced two principles in dealing with such
issues. First, although not as aggressive as many progressives would
have preferred, the Court itself was actively involved in promoting
racial balance in public schools in both the North and the South.1
1. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. Of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-
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Second, the justices were willing to countenance even more aggressive
actions by the federal government that were designed to ensure that
African-Americans in particular were treated fairly by state
governments.2
One of the early signs of a change in the Court’s approach to
these issues came with the 1991 decision in Board of Education of
Oklahoma City v. Dowell,3 where the justices signaled their retreat
from involvement in the process of school desegregation. More than
two decades later, in Shelby County v. Holder,4 the Court took even
more dramatic action, effectively invalidating the preclearance
provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which had been designed
to ensure that changes in state voting and election laws would not
undermine the ability of African-Americans to participate fully in
electoral politics. In both cases, the Court took the position that the
conditions that once justified such aggressive measures had largely
disappeared.
While both Dowell and Shelby County have been the subject of
extensive academic commentary, scholars have not focused on the
relationship between the perspective on race relations that underlay
those decisions and that which informed the jurisprudence of Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who served on the Court from 1972 through 1987.
Powell was a pillar of the white establishment in Richmond, Virginia,
and was the chair of the city school board during the period
immediately following the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.5
Although he opposed the doctrine of massive resistance, Powell was
openly critical of the Brown decision and consistently sought to limit
the impact of the decision on the racial composition of the Richmond
schools. In addition, he objected to the use of the preclearance
requirement of the Voting Rights Act to prevent the implementation
of a measure that was clearly designed to perpetuate white control of
the Richmond City Council.
By the time that Powell joined the Court, he had apparently
become reconciled to the basic principles embodied in Brown.
Nonetheless, he continued to oppose both the use of aggressive

Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
2. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); S.C. v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966).
3. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
4. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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measures designed to improve the racial balance of previously
segregated schools and the imposition of the preclearance
requirement on the South. More generally, Powell’s treatment of the
race-related issues that came before the Court during his tenure as a
justice emphasized his conviction that systemic racial discrimination
was largely a thing of the past, and that any lingering vestiges of
racism could generally be addressed adequately without disrupting
the existing structure of governmental institutions. Powell was unable
to convince a majority of his colleagues on the Burger Court to follow
his lead in cases dealing with school desegregation and voting rights.
By contrast, as this article demonstrates, the arguments that Powell
made in those cases were the precursors of the analysis that would
later underlie the positions taken by the Court in cases such as Dowell
and Shelby County.
I. THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN GENTLEMAN6
Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr. was born in Suffolk, Virginia on
September 19, 1907. After spending several years in the Richmond
public school system, Powell attended McGuire’s University School, a
private, college preparatory high school which generally sought to
send its graduates to the University of Virginia. However, hoping for
an opportunity to play intercollegiate baseball, Powell chose instead
to attend Washington and Lee College, a segregated, all-male
institution that was deeply steeped in the traditions of the Old South.
Although Powell was unable to earn a place on the college
baseball team, he achieved great success in a wide variety of other
endeavors while at Washington and Lee. In addition to graduating
magna cum laude with a degree in business and being elected to Phi
Beta Kappa, he became the president of both his fraternity and the
student body as a whole, was managing editor of the school
newspaper, worked on the staff of the yearbook, and helped produce
campus balls. In recognition of his accomplishments, Powell received
the Algernon Sidney Sullivan Medallion, which was awarded to the
student “who excels in high ideals of living, in spiritual qualities, and
in genuine and disinterested service to others.”7

6. The description of Powell’s early life and education is taken from JOHN C. JEFFRIES,
JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
7. Id. at 26–31.
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From the time that he entered college, believing that “soldiers and
lawyers made most of the history,”8 Powell’s goal was to attend law
school. By beginning to take law courses as an undergraduate, Powell
was able to finish both his undergraduate and law school courses at
Washington and Lee in six years, graduating first in his law school
class in June, 1931. At the insistence of his father, Powell then spent a
post-graduate year at Harvard Law School, receiving an LL.M. degree
in 1932.9
Following his year at Harvard, Powell was offered a position as an
associate at the Wall Street law firm of Davis Polk and Wardwell.
However, he chose instead to return to Richmond. After practicing
for three years with a small firm, Powell accepted a position as an
associate at Hunton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore, [hereinafter
Hunton, Williams] the preeminent law firm in the city,10 and remained
with that firm until he joined the Supreme Court in 1972.
In addition to his private practice, Powell immersed himself in the
civic life of the city of Richmond and the state of Virginia. Believing
that pro bono work was “a duty of citizenship that should be
undertaken quite apart from the possibility of establishing broader
personal recognition” and also had the “positive by-product” of
enhancing the standing of a young lawyer in the community,11 Powell
became well known for providing free legal services to a wide variety
of charitable organizations. In addition, Powell took a strong interest
in political and governmental affairs. In 1947, he was elected to the
commission that rewrote the city charter. Three years later, Powell
was chosen to serve on the Richmond School Board. In 1961, he was
appointed to the state Board of Education and in 1968 became a
member of the Commission on Constitutional Revision that was
charged with the task of revising the state constitution.12
II. RACIAL ATTITUDES
A. Overview
Powell came of age at a time when Virginia society, like that of the
other states in the South, was rigidly segregated by race. The policy of
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 37–39.
Id. at 44–46.
Id. at 123–24.
Id.
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segregation was embodied in the Jim Crow laws that required the
separation of whites and African-Americans on railroads and in
public schools and places of amusement. Moreover, during the early
twentieth century, political power in the Southern states rested
entirely with the white population. Although formally prohibited by
the Fifteenth Amendment from using race as a qualification for
voting, Virginia and the other Southern states used a wide variety of
formal and informal measures to prevent or discourage AfricanAmericans from participating in the political process. As a result, in
1940, fewer than five percent of the voting age African-Americans in
the South were registered to vote.13
The maintenance of racial segregation met little resistance from
federal authorities in the early twentieth century. However, beginning
in the 1940s, segregation came under increasing attack from several
different quarters. During that period, the Supreme Court became
more receptive to constitutional attacks on racial classifications.14
Even more importantly, the opponents of the Jim Crow system began
to gain traction within the political branches of the federal
government.
A speech made by President Harry S. Truman on February 2, 1948,
reflected the growing opposition to the practice of racial segregation
that pervaded Southern society. The speech was a response to a report
that had been issued by a Committee on Civil Rights which had been
created by Truman on December 5, 1946. The Committee’s mandate
was to “make recommendations with respect to the adoption or
establishment, by legislation or otherwise, of more adequate and
effective means and procedures for the protection of the civil rights of
the people of the United States.” In his speech, Truman called for,
among other things: the establishment of a permanent Commission on
Civil Rights, a Joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a
Civil Rights Division in the Department of Justice; the strengthening
of existing civil rights statutes; the passage of statutes specifically
aimed at providing federal protection against lynching and protecting
the right to vote from discriminatory action by public officials based
on race, color or “other unreasonable classification”; the
establishment of a Fair Employment Practice Commission to prevent
13. Kraig Beyerlein and Kenneth T. Andrews, Black Voting During the Civil Rights
Movement: A Micro-Level Analysis, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 1, 4 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting enforcement of raciallyrestrictive covenants); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (outlawing white primaries).
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unfair discrimination in employment; and a prohibition on racial
discrimination in interstate transportation facilities.15 Five months
later, sounding a similar note, the Democratic National Convention
adopted a platform that praised Truman for his stand on civil rights
and called for passage of federal legislation that would guarantee “(1)
the right of full and equal political participation; (2) the right to equal
opportunity of employment; (3) the right of security of person; (4)
and the right of equal treatment in the service and defense of our
nation.”16
Truman’s speech was condemned by the representatives of the
Southern white establishment in the strongest possible terms. For
example, Senator Harry F. Byrd, the patriarch of the political system
in the state of Virginia, analogized the proposed statute on voting
rights to actions taken by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin and declared
that, taken together, Truman’s proposals comprised “a mass invasion
of states’ rights never before even suggested, much less
recommended, by any previous President of any party affiliation in
the nation’s history” and “could very conceivably lead to
dictatorship.”17
Powell took a similar view of Truman’s civil rights initiatives.
While insisting that he had never been a racist and that he had always
had personal friends in the African-American community, Powell
later conceded that, as late as 1954, he had no difficulty in accepting
the idea that racial segregation should be mandated by law.18 Thus, in
1952, Powell worried that, if elected, Democratic presidential
candidate Adlai Stevenson “will be more successful than Truman in
obtaining the passage of pet left wing legislation such as [a bill
establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission]” and that
such legislation would accelerate “the trend toward socialism.”19
Although Stevenson was defeated, Powell would soon be faced with
the problem of dealing with the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in

15. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, Feb 2, 1948, HARRY S. TRUMAN
PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?
pid=1380&st=&st1= (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
16. 1948
Democratic
Party
Platform,
AMERICAN
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
17. BYRD SAYS ‘RIGHTS’ MEANS DICTATORSHIP: Truman Board Seeks Power of
Kind Hitler and Stalin Got, He Tells Richmond Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 20, 1948, at 3.
18. JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 139.
19. A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in Federal
Securities Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 855 n.88 (2003) (quoting Justice Powell).
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Brown v Board of Education,20 which posed a direct challenge to the
maintenance of the Jim Crow system.
B. Powell and the Aftermath of Brown
As the chair of the Richmond school board, Powell was forced to
directly confront the implications of Brown. After the decision was
announced, Powell stated privately that “I am not in favor of, and will
never favor compulsory integration.”21 However, unlike many white
Southerners, Powell did not believe that Southern whites should
openly defy the mandates of the Supreme Court. Instead, like other,
more moderate opponents of school desegregation, he took the view
that the governments of the Southern states should take measures
that were formally consistent with the requirements imposed by
Brown but that nonetheless left the schools almost entirely segregated
in fact.22
Initially, it seemed that this view might also shape the official
policy of the state of Virginia. On November 11, 1955, a committee
chaired by state senator Garland Gray, and charged by Virginia
Governor Thomas B. Stanley with the task of making
recommendations on how best to respond to Brown proposed a
number of measures designed to provide for the continued existence
of a system of public education in the state, while at the same time
“making provision for localities wherein public schools are
abandoned, and providing educational opportunities for children
whose parents will not send them to integrated schools.” The
proposed legislation would have given local school boards broad
discretion to determine the public schools to which individual
students would be assigned, subject to the proviso that no student
would be reassigned from the school that he was currently attending
absent “good cause shown.” In making assignments under the Gray
Commission Plan, the local boards would have been authorized to
consider not only the welfare of the child being assigned, but also “the
welfare and best interests of all other pupils attending a particular

20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 140.
22. See generally ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN
MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009)
(describing the ideology of white Southern moderates and the tactics that they employed in
detail).
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school,” as well as other factors such as the availability of facilities
and transportation, and the “health [and] aptitude of the child.”23
In addition to proposing that local school boards be allowed great
discretion in assigning students to schools, the Gray Commission
report also made a number of other specific proposals that were
clearly intended to limit the potential impact of the Brown decisions.
The report advocated the adoption of measures that would have
declared that no student should be required to attend an integrated
school and that school districts that chose to close their public schools
rather than submit to integration should be empowered to raise and
spend public funds for tuition grants that would defray the cost of
attendance at private schools. Moreover, the report called for
legislation designed to ensure that even in those districts where the
public schools remained open, tuition grants would be made available
in order to “prevent enforced integration . . . by providing for the
education of those children whose parents object to their education at
mixed schools.”24
The Gray Commission report left Powell somewhat conflicted.
Soon after the report was issued, Powell stated his position clearly in a
letter to David J. Mays, who had served as legal counsel to the
commission. On one hand, Powell expressed his opposition to the idea
of tuition grants, asserting that “I am confident that [the provision of
tuition grants] will not work in Richmond, and I doubt that it will
work anywhere else constitutionally for any length of time.” On the
other, while conceding that the pupil assignment procedure described
by the report had “some very troublesome aspects,” Powell
characterized the use of that procedure as “the best possible
approach.”25
All parties to the controversy understood that the student
assignment process envisioned by the Gray Commission was expected
to be used to prevent or retard the integration of the public schools in
Virginia. Nonetheless, many white Virginians believed that even the
Gray Commission report as a whole did not provide for a sufficiently

23. Virginia Commission on Public Education, Hearings on the Nominations of William
H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., of Virginia, November 11, 1955, at 8–11,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/GPO-CHRG-REHNQUIST-POWELL/GPO-CHRGREHNQUIST-POWELL-7-4-14 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
24. Id.
25. Letter from LFP to David J. Mays, December 1, 1955, Box 250, Folder 13, Lewis F.
Powell Papers, Washington and Lee University (hereinafter LFP Papers).
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aggressive response to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Brown I
and Brown II. Thus, on February 24, 1956, Byrd called for “massive
resistance” to the idea of integrating the public schools. Supporters of
this concept argued that the state could legitimately “interpose” its
authority to prevent unconstitutional interference by the federal
government with local prerogatives—a theory that called to mind the
concept of nullification that had at times been deployed
unsuccessfully by Southerners prior to the Civil War.26
In August, 1955, the state legislature adopted a series of measures
designed to implement the policy of massive resistance.27 Unlike the
Gray Commission proposals, under the new program, control over the
placement of students was transferred to a state Pupil Placement
Board, which was composed of members who were staunchly opposed
to even token integration. The legislature also required the state to
withdraw funding from any local school district that attempted to
desegregate its classrooms and to close the public schools in those
districts. Other legislation provided for the use of tuition grants to
allow students to attend segregated private schools in districts where
the public schools were no longer open.
Although he made no public comment on the desegregation
controversy, in private communications with other members of the
political establishment, Powell made no secret of his personal opinion
of these measures. While he was in general a loyal supporter of the
Byrd organization at the time that Brown I was decided, Powell
strongly opposed the idea of massive resistance, characterizing the
concept as “legal nonsense” and “a doctrine of chaos—not of law.”28
At one point, Powell made tentative arrangements to have his assault
on interposition published in the American Bar Association Journal.
However, after consultations with the Hunton, Williams attorneys
who were representing Prince Edward County in the ongoing
desegregation litigation, he withdrew the proposal and made no other
public comment on massive resistance.29
In theory, of course, Powell might have taken the moral high
ground and refused to make any concessions to supporters of the
position taken by the Byrd organization. However, he and the other
members of the school board took the view that such an approach
26.
27.
28.
29.

JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 137–38.
These measures are described in Jeffries, supra note 6, at 136.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 149–50.
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would have had a disastrous impact on the Richmond public schools.
Indeed, as Powell observed later, the school board believed that, given
the existing state laws and climate of public opinion in Virginia in the
period immediately following the Brown decisions, “had we
attempted to integrate the schools [during this period] this would
have resulted in closing the schools.”30 Moreover, such fears were by
no means unfounded; for example, in 1958, the governor of Virginia
ordered the closure of the public schools in the cities of
Charlottesville and Norfolk after federal courts mandated the
desegregation of the schools in both districts.31
By contrast, at least in the abstract, Powell and the other members
of the Richmond school board had more options in the wake of two
judicial decisions that were handed down in January, 1959. In James v.
Almond, a three-judge federal district court held that the state could
not constitutionally close the Norfolk public schools in order to avoid
desegregation, declaring that
the Commonwealth of Virginia . . . cannot act . . . to close one or
more public schools in the state solely by reason of the assignment to,
or enrollment or presence in, that public school of children of
different races or colors, and, at the same time, keep other public
schools throughout the state open on a segregated basis.32
Although the Almond court itself explicitly left open the
possibility that the state could withdraw its support from all of the
public schools in the state, on the same day, in Harrison v. Day, the
Virginia Supreme Court foreclosed this option, concluding that
section 129 of the Virginia constitution imposed a “mandatory duty”
on the state legislature to fund a public school system.33
Faced with this new reality, on February 5, 1959, Virginia Governor
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. established a new commission chaired by state
senator Mosby Perrow, Jr. and charged that commission with the task
of reformulating the state’s approach to the issue of desegregation.
Some staunch opponents of integration urged the commission to
recommend that the state repeal section 129. They argued that this
change in the state constitution would pave the way for the
elimination of state support for public schools and the establishment

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 136–37.
170 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Va. 1959) (per curiam) .
106 S.E.2d 636 (1959).
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of a system of private segregated academies organized on a local basis
and supported by tuition grants appropriated from state funds.34
In a March 10 letter to Byrd, Powell urged him not to embrace this
proposal.35 Powell’s opposition to the repeal movement was not based
on support for the concept of desegregation. Instead, arguing that the
elimination of state funding of public education would be unwise and
that, if section 129 were repealed, “any system of private schools
supported directly or indirectly with state funds would inevitably go
down before the federal court,”36 he insisted that “if the unhappy
choice becomes inevitable (as it apparently will) between the
abandonment or emasculation of public education or some
integration, I believe that Virginia must choose the latter.”37
But at the same time, Powell also suggested that the state adopt
measures that would, in his words, “ameliorate or retard integration.”
He gave as one example the pupil assignment plan that had been
created by the Pearsall Committee in North Carolina.38 Much like the
regime that had been proposed by the Gray Commission, the Pearsall
Plan vested the power to assign students in local school boards, which
in turn were expected to make their decisions based on “natural racial
preference and the administrative determination of what is best for
the child.”39
The practical consequences of this approach were entirely
predictable. After the Pearsall plan was adopted, many school boards
refused to allow any African-American students to transfer to
previously all-white schools, while other school boards allowed only
token desegregation of local schools.40 Thus, Powell’s embrace of this
plan can only be viewed as a reflection of a belief that the officials
charged with the administration of the public schools in Virginia
should, if possible, act to minimize the impact of formal desegregation
on the actual racial composition of the schools in Richmond and
elsewhere.

34. LFP to Harry Byrd, March 10, 1959, Box 6, Folder 5 LFP Papers supra note 25, at 1.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 1–2.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Pearsall Committee, The Pearsall Plan to Save Our Schools, UNC GREENSBORO,
http://libcdm1.uncg.edu/cdm/ref/collection/CivilRights/id/533 (last visited April 8, 2019).
40. See generally WALKER, supra note 22, at Ch. 2. (discussing the evolution and impact of
the Pearsall Plan).
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Nonetheless, Powell believed that the issue of desegregation was
only one of the factors that should be considered in making more
general policy judgments regarding the proper functioning of the
Richmond school district as a whole. Soon after he had dispatched his
letter to Byrd, this point was clearly illustrated by the role taken by
Powell in the discussions of a plan to build two new high schools to
meet the needs of the city’s burgeoning student population. The
school board had proposed to locate the new schools in white
neighborhoods that were close to areas with growing AfricanAmerican populations. However, when the board sought funding for
the project from the Richmond city council, some members of the
council opposed the request on the ground that building new schools
at the proposed locations would facilitate integration.41
Powell, on the other hand, sought to characterize the impact of the
new high schools quite differently. In his first public comment on the
dispute over desegregation, he observed that some integration had
become inevitable. He contended that, given this reality, “the new
schools would appreciably improve both the short and long range
prospect for minimizing the impact of integration.” He asserted that
the new schools themselves could be reserved for white children,
which would in turn allow other facilities currently used by whites to
be freed for use in educating African-American children. In contrast,
he claimed, the failure to build the new schools would in time result in
greater overcrowding at African-American schools, thereby increasing
the pressure for integration. Powell also took the opportunity to
declare that “we foresee no substantial integration in the elementary
schools in Richmond.”42 Powell’s defense of the school board
proposal apparently mollified the supporters of segregation, and the
funding for the project was approved by the council.
More than two decades later, Powell claimed in a private
memorandum to his children that it was necessary to publicly express
his opposition to desegregation in order to obtain approval of the
necessary funding from the city council.43 However, the evidence does
not support the suggestion that, if given the option in 1959, Powell
would have moved aggressively to desegregate the Richmond public

41. JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 155.
42. Powell Outlines Views of School Board, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 7, 1959, at
5–6.
43. “Desegregation Era—Interposition/Massive Resistance,” Memorandum from LFP to
my Children, August 23, 1983, p. 2, LFP Papers, Box 1, Folder 22.
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schools. Instead, both Powell’s letter to Byrd and his subsequent
actions plainly indicate that, at least at this point in his life, the future
Supreme Court Justice remained hostile to the prospect of substantial
integration of the Richmond schools.
In 1960, this attitude was reflected in the Richmond school board’s
internal discussions of a decision to attempt to convert Chandler
Junior High School to a school serving African-Americans of both
junior and senior high school age. At the time that the conversion was
under consideration, Chandler was a school for white children that
was located more than two miles south of the site of the new John
Marshall High School and was near the northern border between
Richmond’s African-American and white residential neighborhoods.
The main impetus behind the effort to convert the school was the
need to provide facilities to accommodate the growing number of
minority students attending the city schools.44
Prior to 1960, a number of other previously all-white schools had
been converted for the same reasons. The members of the school
board believed that, once the new John Marshall High School was
completed, it could accommodate the white students who would
otherwise have been assigned to Chandler, and that the conversion of
Chandler would be the least expensive method of relieving the
overcrowding that plagued a number of other African-American
schools in Richmond in 1960. In addition, however, the school board
saw the conversion of Chandler as an integral part of a strategy that
was designed to limit the extent of integration in the Richmond
school district more generally.45
The view that the conversion would in fact limit integration was at
least implicitly based on a number of assumptions. First, in 1960, the
school board and its staff clearly believed that they would at some
point be ordered by a federal court to abandon the policy of
maintaining schools that were formally segregated by race. Second,
they apparently believed that any desegregation order would
probably be based upon geographical principles. Finally, the school
board assumed that the African-American population of Richmond
would continue its historical pattern of expanding northward within
44. “Chandler High School,” Memorandum to Members of the Richmond School Board
from H. I. Willett, February 18, 1960, LFP Papers, Box 250, Folder 14; Memorandum to LFP
from Assistant Superintendents Richmond Public Schools, February 22, 1960, id.
45. Memorandum from Assistant Superintendents Richmond Public Schools, supra note
44, at 2.
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the city.46 Thus, although the site chosen for John Marshall was well
north of the areas occupied by the African-American community in
1959, many residents of Richmond (including the members of the
school board itself) believed that significant numbers of AfricanAmerican families would move closer to the new school within a
relatively short period of time.
Given these assumptions, from the perspective of those who, like
Powell, wished to limit the scope of integration, the strategic
advantages of the proposed Chandler conversion were clearly
apparent. Unlike the new site of John Marshall, Chandler was located
on the northern edge of the territory already populated by AfricanAmerican families. Therefore, in 1959, from a purely geographical
perspective, all high school students from that community were living
closer to Chandler than to the John Marshall site. Moreover, most
African-Americans would continue to be in closer proximity to
Chandler for a considerable time even after the residential
boundaries of their community spread northward.
As a result, the school officials in Richmond believed that, if at
some point in the future a federal judge ordered students to be
assigned purely on the basis of geography, the conversion of Chandler
to an African-American school serving both junior and senior high
school students “would be strategically located to protect the new
John Marshall High School [which was itself designed to serve grades
eight through twelve] from massive integration.” Conversely, the
school board thought that unless Chandler was converted, the only
cure for the overcrowding at existing African-American schools
would be to transfer some African-Americans from overcrowded
facilities to underutilized white schools and that, without conversion,
Chandler itself would become vulnerable to “massive” integration.47
The members of the school board also viewed the conversion of
Chandler as a crucial element in the board’s defense against a class
action lawsuit that had been filed in September, 1958, on behalf of
African-American students who had been denied the opportunity to
attend white schools in Richmond. A majority of the AfricanAmerican plaintiffs who were seeking to transfer wished to attend
Chandler. Moreover, school officials understood that, in order to

46. Memorandum from Thomas C. Little to H. I. Willett, February 18, 1960, LFP Papers,
Box 250, Folder 14.
47. Memorandum, Assistant Superintendents to LFP, supra note 44, at 1.
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prevail in the lawsuit, at the very least they would need to claim that
African-Americans had access to equal educational opportunities in
the city public schools, a position that would be much more difficult to
maintain if the existing African-American schools remained
substantially overcrowded. Thus, in a February 22, 1960 memorandum
to Powell, the assistant superintendent of the Richmond schools
observed that, if Chandler were not converted to use by AfricanAmerican students, “there could be no immediate relief of the
crowded conditions in Negro schools except through integration”48
and “it is feared that the case in the [f]ederal court would be
jeopardized.”49
Despite these considerations, the proposal to convert Chandler
created a political firestorm. Although in the short term the
conversion would have relieved the overcrowding in the city’s
African-American schools, some Richmond civil rights leaders
complained that the very idea of conversion derived from the same
basic concept of segregated schools that had been condemned in
Brown.50 However, much of the opposition came from an entirely
different quarter: white residents who lived near Chandler and were
intent on preventing the spread of the African-American community
into their neighborhoods.
These residents believed that the creation of a school for
African-Americans near the existing boundary would incentivize
African-Americans to attempt to purchase property on the all-white
“Northside,” which was also near Chandler. The school board itself
had concluded that this area would eventually become inhabited by
African-Americans in any event.51 However, many whites who lived
near Chandler disagreed. Thus, for example, while conceding in a
letter to Powell that “the School Board cannot control or prevent . . .
population shifts,” one opponent of the conversion observed that
“[the board] can speed or force them” and insisted that “that is
exactly what the decision to convert Chandler would do.”52
The dispute over the proposed conversion came to a head at a
public meeting on February 24, 1960, attended by nearly 1,400 people.
The crowd was dominated by whites from the Northside, and a
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 157–59.
“Chandler High School,” supra note 44, at 3.
W. F. Maldeis to LFP, March 22, 1960, LFP Papers, Box 250, Folder 14.
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number of the speakers emphasized what they viewed as the potential
impact of the conversion on the geographical expansion of the
African-American community into their neighborhood. By contrast,
when civil rights leader Oliver H. Hill rose to advocate integration
rather than conversion, Hill was subjected to what he later described
as “an uproar of boos, catcalls and epithets” and was allowed to
continue only after Powell stood beside him and insisted on the
restoration of order.53
In the face of this vocal opposition, the school board voted to
defer the conversion of Chandler in order to allow for “the
opportunity, without haste or political pressure, for calm and objective
reconsideration of all possibilities.” In its public statement
announcing the decision, the board reiterated its view that “the
conversion of Chandler should minimize the integration problem
which faces Richmond.”54 At the same time, however, the board
insisted that “the plan to convert was based entirely on unrelated
considerations.”55
Powell’s endorsement of the Pearsall Plan and support for the
Chandler conversion were consistent with the position that he had
originally taken on the Gray Committee proposals in 1955. Moreover,
the removal of the possibility that desegregation would lead to closure
of the Richmond public schools did nothing to change the basic
structure of the city school system during the remainder of the time
that Powell served as the chair of the school board. Each of the
schools in the system was explicitly labeled either “white” or
“Negro,” and although the state Pupil Placement Board remained
formally responsible for assigning students, until August 15, 1960, the
state board uniformly assigned white students to white schools and
African-Americans to “Negro” schools. On that date, the board
allowed two African-American students to enter Chandler, thereby
rendering the debate over conversion moot.56

53. Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 395, 410–
11 (1987).
54. Decision Postponed on Chandler School, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 25, 1960,
at 1.
55. Id. at 4.
56. ROBERT A. PRATT, THE COLOR OF THEIR SKIN: EDUCATION AND RACE IN
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 1954-1989 25 (1992).
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C. The Ongoing Struggle Over the Desegregation of the Richmond
Schools
The dispute over the conversion of Chandler marked Powell’s last
confrontation with the issue of desegregation as a member of the
Richmond school board. In January, 1961, he resigned from that
position after accepting an appointment to the Virginia State Board of
Education and thereafter had no official input into the policy
decisions that determined the course of desegregation in the city.
Nonetheless, Powell retained a keen interest in the affairs of the
school system in general and the problem of desegregation in
particular. In 1963, he was one of a number of prominent attorneys
who were asked by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to discuss
the prospects for improvement in race relations in their local
communities. Powell’s reply once again reflected his attitude toward
the basic idea of school desegregation.57
The events that had taken place in the years immediately
following Powell’s departure from the school board provided the
backdrop for his assessment of the situation. As already noted, during
this period, the state Pupil Placement Board had retained the
authority to make student assignments in the city schools. Moreover,
even after the admission of African-Americans to Chandler in 1960,
until 1963, every school in the city continued to be labeled either
“white” or “Negro” by the city school board, and also drew students
from a designated attendance area. Absent a specific request to the
contrary, each student was initially assigned to the school which
corresponded to his race and the attendance zone in which he or she
lived, and after having graduated from their elementary schools,
students were routinely assigned to junior high schools and high
schools associated with the same race. In addition, African-American
students who wished to transfer to white junior or senior high schools
were required to meet academic standards that were not applied to
white students from the same attendance area. As a result, during the
1962 school year, of the over twenty-three thousand AfricanAmerican students in the Richmond public school system, only thirtyseven attended schools with white students.58
After this system was found unconstitutional in federal court, the
Richmond school board formally changed its policy. In March, 1963,
57. LFP to Robert F. Kennedy, July 23, 1963, LFP Papers, Box 209, Folder 3.
58. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Richmond, 317 F.2d 429, 432 (1963).

MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN

5/15/2019 10:28 PM

187

the board adopted a series of resolutions that required each student
entering the system to affirmatively state which school he wished to
attend, and to repeat the process at the time that he entered junior
high school and high school. The resolutions also provided for free
transfers between schools.59 While eliminating the formal
consideration of race from the process, in practice the new system had
only a very limited impact on the demographic makeup of the
individual schools. Thus, in the fall of 1963, only 312 AfricanAmerican students attended school with their white counterparts in
Richmond.60 As a result, in his response to Kennedy’s request, even
Powell was forced to acknowledge the fact that the desegregation of
the city schools was “naturally not progressing as rapidly as Negro
leaders would wish.” He also noted that the actions of the school
board were being challenged in federal court.61
Despite this lack of concrete results, Powell’s letter to Kennedy
described the situation in Richmond as “generally satisfactory.”
Apparently referring to the admission of the two African-American
students to Chandler in 1960, he noted that the process of
desegregation had begun during the period in which he had chaired
the school board. In addition, Powell observed that “each year the
extent of integration increases” and predicted that “as long as this is
accomplished gradually and without too much public pressure, there
will be a large measure of acceptance by whites.”62
This assessment aptly reflected Powell’s attitude toward the
desegregation of the Richmond public schools more generally. Unlike
the supporters of massive resistance, by the late 1950s, he had (albeit
reluctantly) demonstrated a willingness to accept the reality that
formal segregation would have to be abandoned. However, Powell
had no real commitment to the ideal of integration in practice.
Instead, he firmly believed that, in deference to the sensibilities of
white residents of Richmond, the process of integration should
proceed only at a pace that Powell characterized as “gradual,” but
that most objective observers would more likely have described as
glacial.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.; PRATT, supra note 56, at 36.
PRATT, supra note 56, at 36.
LFP to Robert F. Kennedy, supra note 57, at 1.
Id.
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D. Powell and the Prince Edward County Schools
The same attitude that had marked his approach to desegregation
in Richmond was also reflected in Powell’s actions when, as a member
of the state board of education, he was called upon to deal with the
fallout from the ongoing struggle over desegregation in Prince
Edward County. After the collapse of statewide massive resistance in
1959, the government authorities in Prince Edward County had closed
the county public schools to avoid submitting to even token
desegregation. The public schools in the county remained closed until
they were ordered reopened by the Supreme Court in 1964. In the
interim, the white students in the county attended segregated private
academies that had been created to replace the public schools.
At first, the private academies were financed in part by state
tuition grants and also received additional financial support from the
county government. However, in August, 1961, a federal court issued
an order barring state officials from “receiving, processing or
approving applications for state scholarship grants from persons
residing in Prince Edward County so long as the public schools of
Prince Edward County remained closed.”63 Thus, from 1961 through
1963, the white students attending the segregated academies were
forced to finance their educations entirely from private funds.
Ironically, the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Griffin v. County
School Board,64 which required that the public schools of Prince
Edward County be reopened, gave new hope to the proponents of
tuition grants. On its face, Griffin was a major defeat for the
remaining supporters of massive resistance. But by ordering that the
schools be reopened, the decision also appeared to remove the
predicate for the ban on the payment of tuition grants. Thus, after
Griffin was decided, Virginia’s attorney general expressed the view
that the prohibition imposed by the earlier court order was no longer
in force. Against this background, although Powell had privately
complained that “Prince Edward [County] is increasingly becoming a
serious reflection on the good name of Virginia,” on July 1, 1964, he
joined the other members of the state board of education in
approving applications for the payment of tuition grants for the

63. Allen v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty, 198 F. Supp. 497, 504 (E.D. Va. 1961)
(emphasis added).
64. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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previous school year, notwithstanding the fact that the deadline for
applying for such grants had passed and that in 1963.65
While James Jeffries argues that Powell saw the vote as nothing
more than a decision to effectuate the will of the legislature,66 Powell’s
communications with Harry Byrd suggest a different explanation for
his support of the motion to extend the deadline. Admittedly, in 1955,
Powell had been flatly opposed to the use of public funds to support
tuition grants. By 1959, however, his views had apparently changed.
Clearly referring to localities such as Prince Edward County, in the
same letter in which he advocated the adoption of a Pearsall-type plan
to deal with the situation in places such as Richmond, Powell also
observed that “there are many areas in Virginia that will simply not
tolerate integration,” and contended that “it is . . . necessary to
provide these communities with some acceptable alternative” by
“provid[ing] the means for local communities and possibly individuals
to experiment with alternatives.”67 Thus, Powell suggested that it
would be appropriate for the state to provide funds for tuition grants
that would predictably be used to support the establishment of
segregated private schools in those areas, notwithstanding his
conviction that “such schools will [not], on the average be anything
like as satisfactory as state supervised public school education.”68
Considered against the background of his other actions, Powell’s
willingness to countenance the use of tuition grants in this context
should not be construed as reflecting approval of the tactics used by
jurisdictions such as Prince Edward County in an effort to avoid
desegregation. Instead, he apparently believed simply that, given the
reality of the attitude of whites toward desegregation, providing
tuition grants for school-aged children would be the best of a set of
bad options available to the state government. Powell’s decision to
approve the applications for tuition grants in 1964 may well have
reflected a similar calculation.
Whatever considerations in fact influenced Powell’s vote, the
practical import of his choice was clear. By supporting the waiver of
the application deadline, he voted to reduce the financial cost to white
students of the decision to abandon the public school system in order
to avoid attending schools with African-Americans and also implicitly
65.
66.
67.
68.

JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 176.
Id. at 176–77.
LFP to Harry F. Byrd, March 10, 1959, supra note 34, at 3.
Id. at 4.
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refused to condemn such resistance to desegregation. Thus, at the very
least, Powell’s vote on the tuition grant issue once again demonstrates
that during the mid-1960s, he had no particular interest in advancing
the process of integrating the schools.
E. Powell and School Busing
In 1970, Powell rejoined the public debate over desegregation
during the Supreme Court’s consideration of Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education.69 Neither the city of Richmond nor
the state of Virginia was directly involved in the Swann litigation.
Nonetheless, it was the evolving situation in the Richmond school
system that provided the backdrop for Powell’s participation in the
case.
In the late 1960s, the placement of students in the Richmond
schools was governed by the freedom of choice plan that had been
adopted by the Richmond school board in 1962, ultimately accepted
by the plaintiffs in the Bradley litigation, and finally implemented
during the 1966-67 school year. As already noted, under this plan, the
parents of the students in the public schools were allowed to have
their children attend any public school in the city, provided only that
the curriculum was suitable and space was available. However, as in
most jurisdictions, the advent of freedom of choice had only a limited
impact on the racial composition of the individual public schools in
Richmond.
A variety of factors contributed to this reality. Residential
neighborhoods in Richmond remained highly segregated, and in many
cases African-Americans were reluctant to venture into other parts of
the city to attend schools where the other members of the student
body often resented their presence. White students were even more
reluctant to travel significant distances to attend schools with large
African-American populations. In addition, because Richmond did
not provide free transportation for public school students, those who
did not attend their neighborhood schools and relied on public
transportation often incurred substantial financial costs.70
The impact of the combination of residential segregation and the
ongoing preference of students for their neighborhood schools was
reflected in the continuing racial imbalance in the individual schools.
69. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
70. PRATT, supra note 56, at 41–55.
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During the 1969-70 school year, the student bodies of seven of the
seventeen secondary schools in Richmond were at least eighty-eight
percent African-American, and in five of the other schools, the
student body was more than ninety percent white. Similarly, twentyone of the forty-four elementary schools in the city were at least
ninety percent African-American, while seventeen of the remaining
twenty-three schools were at least eighty-six percent white.71
However, the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. New Kent
County Board of Education72 dramatically changed the jurisprudential
landscape of the struggle over desegregation. Green came to the
Court as a challenge to the student assignment policy of New Kent
County, a small rural county in Virginia that had operated one school
providing elementary and secondary education for all white students
and one school providing the analogous services to all AfricanAmerican students until 1965.73 In that year, in response to a newly
filed law suit and the threat of losing federal funding, the school
district adopted a freedom of choice plan, which essentially allowed
students in the district to choose to attend either of the two schools.74
By 1968, fifteen percent of the county’s African-American students
had chosen to attend the formerly all-white school, but no white
students had chosen to attend the formerly all-African-American
school.75 Despite these results, the plan met the guidelines that had
been established by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, which was responsible for administering the relevant
portions of the Civil Rights Act.76
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
freedom of choice plan was not an adequate remedy for past
segregation. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court clearly reflected
the impact that Southern intransigence had had on the thinking of the
justices. Beginning with the premise that, under Brown, “school
boards such as [that of New Kent county were] clearly charged with
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to
convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be

71. Id. at 46.
72. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
73. Id. at 433.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 441.
76. U.S. Office for Civil Rights, HEW, Policies on Elementary and Secondary School
Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg 4955 (1968).
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eliminated root and branch,”77 Brennan noted the refusal of the New
Kent County School Board to take any steps toward disestablishment
of its dual school system in the years immediately following the
decision in Brown. Observing that “this deliberate perpetuation of the
unconstitutional dual system can only have compounded the harm of
such a system,”78 Brennan wrote that “the time for mere ‘deliberate
speed’ has run out”79 and declared that “the burden on a school board
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now.”80
In Green itself, the implications of this requirement for the
formulation of a remedy were relatively clear. As Justice Brennan
observed in a footnote, because housing in the county was not
segregated by race, “the elimination of the dual school system and the
establishment of a ‘unitary, nonracial system’ could be readily
achieved with a minimum of administrative difficulty by means of
geographic zoning.”81 By contrast, in urban areas such as Richmond,
which were marked by segregated housing patterns, a simple
requirement that students be assigned to the schools nearest their
homes often in reality produced schools whose student bodies in fact
were either overwhelmingly white or overwhelmingly AfricanAmerican. Moreover, the situation was further complicated by the
fact that, in May, 1969, a state court had approved the annexation of
an overwhelmingly white portion of nearby Chesterfield County
whose residents thereafter accounted for nearly twenty percent of the
population of the newly-expanded city.82 Thus, in 1969, the precise
implications of the Green standards for the configuration of the
Richmond public schools were not entirely clear.
Against this background, on March 10, 1970, the plaintiffs in
Bradley filed a motion requesting the district court to order the school
board to adopt a plan that would create greater racial balance in the
Richmond schools.83 After District Judge Robert R. Mehridge, Jr.
ordered the school board to provide a plan that created a “unitary”
system of public schools, the board submitted a proposal that was
77. Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38.
78. Id. at 438.
79. Id. at 439.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 442.
82. The circumstances surrounding the annexation of Chesterfield County are described in
detail at pp. 199–200 below.
83. Bradley, 317 F. Supp. at 558 (E.D. Va. 1970).
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devised by the representatives of the federal department of Health,
Education and Welfare.84 The HEW proposal relied heavily on the
concept known as “grade pairing,” providing that black and white
schools serving similar geographic attendance zones would be
“paired” by having each school serve different grade levels.85
Mehridge, however, concluded that this proposal did not provide an
adequate remedy for past segregative acts.86
Asserting that the HEW proposal was, “in essence, a
neighborhood school plan,” and that the proposal was “basically a
zoning plan, with some clustering of schools,” Mehridge observed that
the drafters of the plan gave little consideration to race per se, but
instead focused on issues such as “the capacity of the school buildings,
the proximity of the buildings to the pupil population, and factors
such as the safety hazards on the immediate approaches to the schools
in relation to where the pupils lived.” While conceding that “under
certain circumstances [a neighborhood school plan] undoubtedly
would be commendable,” Judge Mehridge insisted that
by reason of the residential patterns in the City of Richmond,
however, wherein there are with rare exceptions distinct White
areas and distinct Black areas, a true neighborhood school plan of
necessity can result only in a system in which there are Black
schools and White schools and not just schools.87

Judge Mehridge buttressed this assertion by describing the impact
that the implementation of the HEW plan would have had on each of
the individual schools in the Richmond school district. Under the
plan, African-Americans would have comprised more than ninety
percent of the student body in eighteen different schools in the
district.88 Conversely, whites would have comprised at least eighty
percent of the student body in thirteen different schools in the
district.89 Moreover, in each of the ten schools located in the newly
annexed area that had previously been part of Chesterfield County,
the student body would have been at least eighty-nine percent white,
and in nine of the ten schools, whites would have comprised at least
ninety-five percent of the student body.90
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 563–65.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Faced with these objections, the school board submitted a new
proposal on July 23, 1970. The revised plan provided not only for
pairing, but also for other changes in student assignments, majority to
minority transfers, and some free transportation of students—
primarily middle school and high school students—who would be
required to travel significant distances to reach their assigned schools.
Judge Mehridge observed that the new proposal reflected a good faith
effort to comply with applicable legal standards and acknowledged
that the revised plan would significantly improve the racial balance of
a number of schools in the Richmond system.91
Nonetheless, Judge Mehridge was not entirely satisfied with the
terms of the school board proposal. Noting that the proposal left a
significant number of schools either identifiably white or identifiably
African-American, Judge Mehridge was particularly disturbed by the
fact that the student bodies of thirteen elementary schools would
remain over ninety percent African-American, while four elementary
schools would be virtually all-white. Because of these issues, Judge
Mehridge concluded that the school board should be required to
submit a third plan within ninety days to address his concerns. At the
same time, however, he recognized that no such plan could be
approved in time to be implemented for the school year that was to
begin on August 31, 1970. Thus, he ordered that the July 23 plan
should form the basis for the assignment of students on an interim
basis for the 1970-71 school year, with the understanding that
permanent student placements would be based on the third plan that
had yet to be submitted or approved.92
Predictably, significant elements of Richmond’s white community
strongly opposed the implementation of even the interim plan. White
parents sometimes complained openly about the consequences of
having their children attend school with significant numbers of
African-Americans, and at times whites resorted to a variety of tactics
in an effort to avoid having their children attend integrated schools. In
some cases, white students simply abandoned the public schools
rather than attend the integrated or predominantly African-American
schools to which they were assigned. Thus, the number of white
students who actually enrolled in the Richmond schools for the 1970-

91. Id. at 573.
92. Id. at 575.
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71 school years was almost twenty-five percent lower than the
number that had been projected.93
These events provided the context for Powell’s participation in
Swann—the first case in which the Supreme Court was called upon to
review the propriety of a desegregation order much like that which
Judge Mehridge sought to impose on the Richmond school district.
Powell was the primary architect of an amicus brief that was filed in
October, 1970 on behalf of the state of Virginia in Swann.94 In
describing the interest of the state in the case, the brief conceded that,
until 1964, any progress toward the desegregation of the public
schools in Richmond and other Virginia school districts was “an
unwilling march prodded by the [federal] courts.”95 At the same time,
however, the brief insisted that “Virginia municipalities are [now]
attempting in good faith to comply with the mandate of the Equal
Protection Clause.”96 Conversely, the brief asserted that the orders
issued by the federal courts had created “chaotic” conditions in many
school districts.97
In particular, the brief claimed that the interim order that had
been issued in August by Mehridge “has resulted in major disruption
to public education” and “has often led to resentment and even
fear.”98 In Powell’s view, the negative effects of the interim order were
likely to be magnified by any final order that was based on the
principles outlined in Mehridge’s August opinion. Asserting that
“racial balance alone was the determining factor in [the decision of
the district court] in the [Richmond case],”99 the brief insisted that
Judge Mehridge had not given adequate weight to other factors in
devising a desegregation plan.100
Powell deployed a variety of different arguments to support his
contention that racial balance should not be the sina qua non of
desegregation plans. First, he asserted that nothing in the Court’s
desegregation cases suggested that the Constitution imposed such a
93. PRATT, supra note 56, at 49–51.
94. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae, Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (No. 281).
95. Id. at 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 5.
100. See id. at 7 (noting that “[t]he court below unduly emphasized racial balance. It also
failed to recognize the relevance of the neighborhood school and the disadvantages for all races
of extensive compulsory busing.”).
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mandate.101 Second, noting that the demographics of cities were
constantly in flux, he contended that the pursuit of racial balance
would induce white families to either leave the cities or enroll their
children in private schools, thereby actually encouraging the
resegregation of the public schools and “accelerat[ing] the process of
urban deterioration.”102
Against this background, Powell argued that the federal courts
should adopt a radically different approach to desegregation cases.
While conceding that racial imbalance was a factor that should be
considered in crafting remedial orders in such cases, he asserted that
“equal opportunity [should not] be measured purely by equality of
resource application and racial balance.”103 Instead, in Powell’s view,
“[the] system [that] best conforms to the constitutional mandate [is
one] that provides, through equal opportunity for every student, the
highest level of achievement for all students of every race,
compensating appropriately for any deficiencies that may have
resulted from previous racial segregation.”104 Similarly, the brief later
declared that “the goal is the best education for all”105 and that “what
. . . the school boards must seek and the courts must approve is the
means to promote equal educational opportunity, regardless of race,
in a system structured for the highest achievement.”106 From this
perspective, the problem with racial segregation was that it was “an
impediment to be removed in striving to achieve that goal.”107
The brief also insisted that, in desegregation orders, “reasonable
discretion must be allowed in the assignment of pupils and the
administration of a school system.”108 At the same time, Powell clearly
believed that, absent judicial intervention, the exercise of this
“reasonable discretion” would lead to the creation of neighborhood
schools and that, particularly at the elementary school level,
neighborhood schools were in general most likely to advance
educational achievement.109 In addition to observing that “the
101. Id. at 11–13.
102. Id. at 14–16.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id.
105. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 94, at 18.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id. at 18.
108. Id. at 17.
109. See id. at 23–24 (“The unique educational advantages of the neighborhood school
system, where it is administered in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, result
in the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of that clause: the best possible education for all
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neighborhood unit provides for ease of access to schools for students,
minimizing costs and time of travel to and from school,”110 he
contended that “educational effectiveness . . . is dependent on the
attitude of parents toward their children’s education, and rationally
configured systems of neighborhood schools play a vital role.”111 He
also asserted that “[c]ommunity schools, when designed in such a way
as to avoid the feelings of disaffection which attend systematic
ghettoization . . . foster such an active parental role because of their
very accessibility.”112
Conversely, while acknowledging that busing of students had in
the past been used to perpetuate segregation and remained a
necessity in some rural school districts, the brief was unsparingly
critical of the use of busing in pursuit of what Powell described as
“rigorously uniform racial balance.”113 Once again focusing primarily
on elementary schools, he contended that widespread busing
“removes a child from a familiar environment and places him in a
strange one . . . separates the child from parental supervision for
longer periods of time . . . undermines the neighborhood or
community school, so desirable at the elementary level . . . and . . .
adds to already strained budgetary demands.”114 Thus, while
conceding that some busing might occasionally be appropriate in a
desegregation plan, Powell concluded that a requirement of
widespread transportation of students in the pursuit of racial balance
“could be disastrous to public education.”115
Powell’s brief in Swann can be analyzed from a variety of different
perspectives. On one level, the argument in the brief can
appropriately be viewed as the byproduct of a significant change in
Powell’s own attitude toward the issue of school desegregation. The
brief implicitly rejected both the policy of evasion embodied in his
1959 letter to Harry Byrd and the advocacy of extreme gradualism
reflected in his 1963 letter to Robert F. Kennedy in favor of a regime
children.”).
110. Id. at 22–23.
111. Id. at 23.
112. Id. at 23–24.
113. See id. at 21–22 (describing what Powell believed to be “[a] notable example of
unreasonable busing” in Los Angeles).
114. Id. at 22.
115. Id. at 11; see also id. at 24 (“Pursuit of absolute racial balance in major metropolitan
areas through the use of extensive busing of students deprives the school system of the singular
advantages of the neighborhood concept, and in at least this respect thwarts the attainment of
equal educational opportunity.”).
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in which school districts would be largely indifferent to issues of race
in the assignment of students—an approach that even Thurgood
Marshall might well have accepted in the late 1950s.116 Indeed, as
Powell observed in the brief, the approach that he advocated in Swann
fit comfortably with the language of Brown II, where the Court had
suggested that what Brown I required was, among other things, “[the]
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis . . . .”117
However, the political and jurisprudential context in which the
Swann brief was written was far different from that of 1959 and 1963.
By 1970, even in the South, few if any mainstream politicians would
have explicitly advocated a policy of either formally segregating the
public schools or openly attempting to evade the basic thrust of
Brown I. Moreover, Green had made it clear that, in most cases, even
freedom of choice plans would no longer be acceptable.118 Thus,
whether or not Powell’s personal feelings had changed, by 1970 the
race-blind approach that he advocated in Swann was clearly the least
intrusive remedial theory that had any chance of winning the support
of a majority of the justices.
In any event, the dispute over school desegregation was not the
only racially-charged issue in which Powell took a personal interest
during his last years as a private citizen. Shortly before his
appointment to the Supreme Court, Powell also became personally
involved in a controversy that implicated the balance of political
power between whites and African-Americans in Richmond. Not
surprisingly, Powell’s approach to this controversy reflected much the
same attitude toward race relations that animated his argument in
Swann.

116. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 234–35 (1994) (noting that the NAACP did not challenge
many school desegregation plans because its leaders, including Marshall, “believed that Brown
established the principle that school boards could not take race into account in assigning
students to schools . . . .”).
117. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia, supra note 94, at 12 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Edu., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)).
118. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430, 440–41 (1968) (“[I]f there
are reasonably available other ways, such for illustration as zoning, promising speedier and
more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom of choice’ must be
held unacceptable.”).
THE
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F. Annexation and the Voting Rights Act
The dispute that attracted Powell’s attention to the issue of voting
rights arose from the long-running effort by the city of Richmond to
annex a portion of Chesterfield County, a largely suburban
community that bordered the Richmond city limits. Although the
annexation effort began in 1961, the officials representing Richmond
and Chesterfield did not reach an agreement on the terms of the
annexation until 1969.119 The state courts approved this agreement,
which provided that twenty-three square miles of the county would be
transferred to city jurisdiction in exchange for a payment of more
than twenty-seven million dollars.120 The issues that concerned Powell
involved the interaction between the annexation process and section
five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,121 which prohibited “covered”
jurisdictions, most of which were located in the South, from changing
election procedures without first obtaining either the approval of the
Justice Department or a judgment from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the use of the new
procedures would not perpetuate racial discrimination.122 In 1966, the
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the
preclearance requirement in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,123 and five
years later, in Perkins v. Mathews,124 a majority of the justices
concluded that annexations by local government were subject to the
requirement.125
At one point, it appeared that the controversy over preclearance
might be short-lived. Under the original Voting Rights Act, the
requirement was imposed for only five years,126 and when Congress
considered extending the life of section five in 1970, the proposal was
opposed not only by white Southern members of Congress but also by
the administration of President Richard M. Nixon.127 Initially, the

119. The complex maneuvering that ultimately resulted in the annexation of Chesterfield
County is described in detail in JOHN V. MOESER & RUTLEDGE M. DENNIS, THE POLITICS OF
ANNEXATION: OLIGARCHIC POWER IN A SOUTHERN CITY (1982).
120. Id. at 123.
121. 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304(a) (West 2018).
122. Id.
123. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
124. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
125. Id. at 437.
126. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.L. 89–110, Aug. 6, 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 438 (1965)
(current version at 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West 2018)).
127. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act,
1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 686–88 (2008).
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House of Representatives approved a voting rights bill that would
have allowed the preclearance requirement to lapse.128 However, both
the House and the Senate ultimately passed what was to become the
first of a series of extensions of the provisions of section five, and
Nixon chose to sign the bill into law.129
These developments provided the backdrop for the dispute over
the Chesterfield annexation. In 1969, apparently believing that such
transactions were not subject to section five, Richmond city officials
had made no effort to have the annexation precleared by the Justice
Department.130 However, on January 28, 1971, after the preclearance
requirement had been extended for an additional five years and
Perkins had made it clear that annexations were subject to the
requirement, the Richmond city attorney sent a letter to the United
States Attorney General asking whether the principles established in
Perkins applied retroactively to annexations that had been completed
prior to the decision.131
On May 7, 1971, the Justice Department sent the Richmond
authorities a letter that formally objected to the Chesterfield
annexation.132 The letter focused on the impact of the annexation on
the demographics of the city of Richmond as a whole. Prior to the
annexation, the population of Richmond had been fifty-two percent
African-American. By contrast, since the population of the area
acquired from Chesterfield County was virtually all white, AfricanAmericans comprised only forty-two percent of the city’s postannexation population. Thus, the Justice Department observed that
the addition of the new territory “inevitably tends to dilute the voting
strength of black voters.” Against this background, the letter also
suggested that “you may . . . wish to consider means of accomplishing
annexation which would avoid producing an impermissible adverse
racial impact on voting, including such techniques as single member
districts.”133
It was the latter suggestion that provoked a response from Powell.
Powell had been the chairman of the Charter Commission that

128. H.R. 4249, 91st Cong. (1969).
129. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.A.).
130. MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 146.
131. Id.
132. 149–50.
133. MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 150–51.
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established the existing form of the Richmond city government, and
he had come away from the experience firmly convinced of the
superiority of at-large elections to single member districts in
municipal governments.134 The strength of this conviction emerged
clearly in a memorandum that Powell submitted to the Justice
Department on August 9, 1971.135
Powell did not formally represent the city of Richmond in its
dealings with the Justice Department. Instead, he purported to speak
only as an “interested citizen and the former Chairman of the
[Charter Commission].”136 Nonetheless, his memorandum strongly
urged the Justice Department to grant its approval to the Chesterfield
annexation.137
The memorandum began with a discussion of the standards that
Powell believed that the Justice Department should apply in
considering annexations in jurisdictions that were subject to the
preclearance requirement.138 Observing that almost any annexation
would change the ratio of white voters to African-American voters,
Powell contended that “the fact that voting ratios are changed by
annexation should be immaterial [to the question of whether a
proposed annexation should be granted preclearance.]”139 He argued
that instead, “the test should be whether the predominate [sic]
purpose [of the annexation] is racial and discriminatory.”140
Against this background, the memorandum next turned to a
discussion of the basic policy considerations implicated by the concept
of annexation generally and in Virginia specifically. Powell noted that
in Virginia, cities were not included in any county.141 Instead, city and
county governments were entirely separate political entities, and cities
had often made efforts to acquire territory from surrounding counties
during the twentieth century.142 Indeed, the city of Richmond itself

134. See LFP to Potter Stewart, February 28, 1980, LFP Case File, City of Mobile v. Bolden,
No. 77-1844.
135. “City of Richmond—Chesterfield Annexation,” August 9, 1971, LFP Papers, Box 118,
Folder 9.
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Id. at 4–7.
139. Id. at 6.
140. Id. at 6–7.
141. Id. at 7–11.
142. Id. at 9–10.
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had annexed nearby territory on ten separate occasions prior to
1971.143
Powell vehemently rejected any suggestion that the annexation
process was intended to provide cities with a mechanism to
discriminate against African-American voters. Instead, he
characterized annexations as a natural response to population
movements over time. He observed that “as a city develops a
peripheral metropolitan, suburban area, there comes a time when it is
economically necessary to recapture portions of such [an] area”
because “the suburban developments . . . deprive the city of essential
revenues from people who enjoy all the benefits of the metropolitan
area.”144 Powell contended that, given this reality, “a Virginia city must
expand its boundaries periodically or the social and economic
consequences—for blacks and whites alike—are disastrous.”145 He
also insisted that the Chesterfield annexation in particular was
justified by “social and economic reasons [that were] deemed
necessary for the citizens involved” and that there were no “racial
overtones” in those reasons.146 Instead, he contended that “if there
had not been a single black voter in the City of Richmond, the
annexation would have been equally necessary and in the public
interest.”147
Indeed, Powell asserted that one of the obstacles to annexation
had been the fear among white residents of Chesterfield that their
children might be bussed to predominantly African-American schools
as part of a court-ordered desegregation plan.148 Conversely, he
contended that “if the reasoning of the Supreme Court in [Swann] be
accepted, the blacks and their children (because of the effect on
desegregation of schools) have far more to gain from this annexation
than the whites.”149
The memorandum then turned to the suggestion that the system
of at-large elections should be replaced by single member districts in
order to prevent the reduction of the political power of the AfricanAmerican community under the post-annexation regime. Arguing that

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 17–18.
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“a municipal government (unlike the state or the federal government)
is strengthened by at-large elections,” Powell insisted that the
Richmond Charter Commission had followed the “prevailing view of
the best scholars of municipal government” when it had chosen to
adopt the at-large system in 1947.150 Observing that under the at-large
system “each citizen is . . . ‘represented’ by all members [of the city
council] and not merely by those from his particular ward,” he
contended that “decisions are [therefore] made, as they should be, on
the basis of the best interest of the city as a whole.”151 He also
asserted that “‘log-rolling’ and ‘trade-offs,’ inevitable and destructive
in a ward system, are rarely found where each councilman is elected
by an at-large vote.”152
Powell also rejected the claim that the transition to single member
districts was necessary to preserve the political influence of AfricanAmericans in a post-annexation Richmond. While conceding that
“some black leaders” now advocated the establishment of single
member districts,153 Powell observed that the African-American
leadership had generally supported the creation of the at-large system
when it was first proposed in 1947.154 In addition, he noted that in
recent years there had been “substantial and increasing black
participation” in the Richmond city government, and that even after
annexation African-Americans would be the “single most cohesive
and influential ‘block’ of voters in the city” and thus that “no
politician could—even if he desired—afford to ignore their views or
their welfare.”155
Like his brief in Swann, Powell’s assessment of the annexation
process and the political situation in Richmond can be evaluated from
a variety of different perspectives. His claim that the concept of
annexation had not traditionally been associated with racial
considerations found considerable support in the historical record.
Between 1906 and 1942, the city had annexed substantial portions of
the neighboring Henrico and Chesterfield counties on four separate
occasions, with each annexation having significantly expanded both
the geographical size and population of the city. As Powell noted in

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
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his memorandum, racial issues do not appear to have played an
important role in the consideration of any of these successful efforts
to expand the limits of the city. For example, although the acquisition
of almost seventeen square miles of land from Henrico County in
1942 had added significantly to the total population of Richmond, the
racial composition of the population of the city had not changed
significantly between 1940 and 1950.156
But at the same time, Powell substantially understated the role
played by racial considerations in the specific annexation that was
being considered by the Justice Department in 1971. As early as 1960,
the issue of race had begun to emerge as a major factor in
determining the success or failure of the city’s attempts to acquire
additional land and population.157 As African-Americans continued to
move from the countryside to the city and substantial numbers of
affluent whites fled the city for the suburbs, the demographics of
Richmond changed substantially. While African-Americans made up
only thirty-two percent of the population of Richmond in 1950, by
1960, forty-two percent of Richmond residents were AfricanAmerican.158 Moreover, in the absence of changes in the boundaries
of the city, the trend was expected to continue, with AfricanAmericans projected to form a majority of the population in the city
before the end of the decade.159
As African-Americans began to comprise a larger percentage of
the Richmond population, the political importance of the city’s
African-American community was enhanced as well. Although whites
continued to dominate the city government until the 1960s, the
increase in African-American influence had begun with the overhaul
of the City Charter to which Powell referred in his memorandum.
Prior to that date, the city had been governed by a council whose
members were selected from single member districts that were
gerrymandered to ensure that only whites would be elected to the
council.160 By contrast, the new charter required all members of the
council to be selected on an at-large basis.161 Although only one
African-American was elected under this system prior to 1964, by

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 30.
Id. at 35-39.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 33.
“City of Chesterfield—Richmond Annexation,” supra note 135, at 13–14.
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1960 the organized African-American vote was in many cases large
enough to hold the balance of power between competing white
candidates.162
Even at this stage, all parties were well aware that the acquisition
of overwhelmingly white suburbs had the potential to slow or reverse
the increase in African-American political influence. This reality was
clearly reflected in the voting patterns in a 1961 referendum on an
ultimately unsuccessful proposal to merge the city of Richmond with
nearby Henrico County. While the white voters of Richmond strongly
supported the proposal, leaders and voters in the African-American
community generally opposed the merger because they feared its
impact on the evolving balance of power in the city.163
While the victory of a single African-American candidate in the
city council elections of 1964 was viewed by some as a harbinger of a
new era of racial harmony, the outcome of the 1966 city council
elections was more disturbing to many members of Richmond’s white
elite. In that election, the first to be held after the passage of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the elimination of the poll tax by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,164 African-Americans comprised thirty-four percent of the
registered voters in Richmond and, by at least one estimate, thirtynine percent of those who actually voted. Moreover, AfricanAmericans claimed three of the nine seats on the council, with one of
those seats being filled by Henry Marsh III, a civil rights lawyer who
was active in school desegregation litigation.165
After this concrete demonstration of the increasing political
power of Richmond’s black community, the specter of a city council
dominated by African-Americans in the near future loomed large in
the calculations of some white politicians. Shortly after the election,
the Richmond Times Dispatch observed that “if present political
trends continue in Richmond, Negro voters will grow steadily
stronger, and within a very few years they may be able to elect a
majority of Richmond’s nine Councilmen.”166 Similarly, the Norfolk
Virginia-Pilot asserted that the results of the 1966 election and
demographic trends more generally had engendered “a hectic search,
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 45–49.
Id. at 38–39.
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
MOESER & DENNIS, supra note 119, at 68.
Id. at 69.
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now under way, for a means to re-establish a white majority in the
city’s population.”167
Against this background, the issue of annexation loomed large in
the city council elections of 1968. Annexation was strongly supported
by candidates endorsed by Richmond Forward, an organization that
represented the interests of the white establishment in the city. By
contrast, the Richmond Crusade for Voters, which was dedicated to
enhancing the political power of African-Americans, was willing to
support annexation of suburban areas only if the system of at-large
elections was abandoned in favor of single member districts. The
racial overtones of the dispute were perhaps most clearly reflected in
a statement by one of the Richmond Forward candidates, who
declared that if the city was unable to obtain jurisdiction over
substantial areas in the suburbs, “Richmond will become a permanent
black ghetto, a happy hunting ground for ambitious political
opportunists.”168
The allies of Richmond Forward retained a majority of the seats
on the city council in 1968 and were determined to consummate an
annexation agreement with Chesterfield County prior to the 1970
elections. In private negotiations with the Chesterfield County
authorities, Richmond Mayor Philip J. Bagley, Jr. and other Richmond
officials consistently expressed their desire to add large numbers of
suburbanites to the city voting rolls, with Bagley at one point
allegedly declaring that “we don’t want the city to go to the [black
people]. We need 44,000 white bodies”—almost precisely the number
ultimately acquired by the city through the annexation agreement.169
While there is no reason to believe that Powell knew of this
specific statement, he could not have been unaware of the political
context in which the debate over the Chesterfield annexation took
place. At the same time, it would probably be a mistake to attribute
Powell’s spirited defense of the legality of both the annexation itself
and the existing at large voting system solely or even primarily to a
desire to maintain white control of the Richmond city government.
Instead, his analysis almost certainly reflected the influence of other
factors.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 82.
169. Id. at 93.
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As his memorandum indicated, Powell believed strongly that
expansion was necessary to the health of the city of Richmond, that
the at-large system of selecting council members was far superior to
one based on single member districts, and that even after annexation
the interests of African-American residents would be adequately
protected by the existing system.170 Seen from this perspective,
Powell’s effort to convince the Justice Department to approve the
annexation without requiring the alteration of the city government
might be viewed as less a product of a positive desire to preserve
white control of the municipal institutions than of indifference to the
impact that the annexation might have on the balance of power in the
city.
In addition, the argument in the Chesterfield memorandum also
reflected Powell’s instinctive distrust of federal intervention into local
affairs. Further, he clearly viewed federal intervention in annexation
disputes as being particularly inappropriate. Thus, in the
memorandum, he declared that “if state and local self-government are
to survive in this country, they must be afforded reasonable freedom
from federal intervention and control.”171 Moreover, while conceding
that “the Voting Rights Act of 1965 goes quite far,” he insisted that
“there was no Congressional intent to frustrate state policy with
respect to annexation and to deny to cities the historic rights to
expand their boundaries.”172
In any event, Powell was ultimately unsuccessful in his efforts to
preserve the system of at-large elections for the Richmond City
Council. The city was forced to accept the conversion to a regime
based on single member wards as the price to be paid for retaining the
territory annexed from Chesterfield.173 Nonetheless, Powell remained
firmly committed to the principles that shaped his approach to the
annexation controversy and particularly to the view that any ongoing
problems of racial discrimination could be adequately addressed
without disrupting existing institutional arrangements. This view
clearly informed Powell’s treatment of many of the constitutional
issues that came before him after he became a member of the
Supreme Court.

170.
171.
172.
173.

“City of Richmond—Chesterfield Annexation,” supra note 135, at 15–16.
Id. at 19.
Id.
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370 (1975).
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III. POWELL ON THE SUPREME COURT
A. Nomination and Confirmation
The sequence of events that led to Powell’s nomination to serve
on the Supreme Court began with the victory of Richard M. Nixon in
the presidential election of 1968.174 During his campaign to secure the
Republican nomination, Nixon had promised a group of white
Southern leaders including Republican Sen. Strom Thurmond of
South Carolina that, if elected, he would appoint a white Southerner
to the Court as soon as possible.175 Despite this representation,
Nixon’s first nomination was Warren E. Burger of Minnesota, whom
Nixon chose to succeed Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had resigned
prior to the election.176 By contrast, after Abe Fortas was forced off
the Court in 1969, Nixon was initially determined to fulfill his pledge
and replace Fortas with a Southerner.177 Powell’s deep Southern roots,
long record of public service, and national reputation among the legal
establishment made him a strong candidate to succeed Fortas.178
Against this background, unbeknownst to Powell himself, he
became Nixon’s first choice to fill the vacancy that had been created
by the Fortas resignation.179 However, before Nixon had made a
decision on the nomination, Powell sent a letter to the president
asking not to be considered for the position.180 Nixon then chose
Clement F. Haynsworth, a native of South Carolina who was serving
as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.181 After the Haynsworth nomination was rejected by the
Senate, Nixon turned to G. Harrold Carswell of Florida, a judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.182 When the
Senate also refused to confirm Carswell, complaining about what he
characterized as unfair prejudice against Southern nominees,183 Nixon

174. LAURA KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON AND THE MAKING
OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT ch. 7 (2017).
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 210–11.
Id.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 227–28.
Robert B. Semple, Jr., President Bitter, N.Y. TIMES, April 10, 1970 at 14.
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then chose Judge Harry F. Blackmun of Minnesota to succeed Fortas,
and Blackmun was confirmed unanimously in 1970.184
Nixon was given another opportunity to fulfill his promise to
appoint a white Southerner when Hugo L. Black and John Marshall
Harlan left the Court in 1971.185 After floating a number of other
potential candidates who engendered opposition from a variety of
different sources, Nixon turned to Powell, whose name was one of
those on a list that had been compiled by Chief Justice Burger.186
Although Powell first rebuffed overtures from Attorney General John
Mitchell, Nixon was ultimately able to persuade Powell to accept the
nomination, which was announced publicly on October 20, 1971.187
The Powell nomination created considerable consternation among
civil rights leaders and some other members of the progressive
community. For example, describing Powell as “a white Southerner
who had distinguished himself as one of the great forces against civil
rights legislation” the head of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference called the nominations of Powell and William H.
Rehnquist “‘insult[s]’ to blacks and poor people.”188 Similarly, John V.
Lindsay, the progressive Republican mayor of New York City charged
that Powell was “insensitive to the most basic problems now dividing
the country.”189
However, while they clearly would have preferred a nominee who
was more sympathetic to their political perspective, other progressives
greeted the Powell nomination with a sense of relief. As one
prominent civil libertarian observed, while most progressives were not
“elated or even pleased” with the nomination, they were nonetheless
“satisfied” with the choice because they believed that Powell would
bring “learning and professional competence along with a high sense
of purpose to his new office.”190 Similarly, the New York Times
asserted that Powell “admirably combines the fundamental
requirements of legal and intellectual distinction with Mr. Nixon’s

184. KALMAN, supra note 174, at 245–47.
185. Id. at 292–94.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. John P. MacKenzie, Judiciary Unit Delays Vote on Both Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov.
12, 1971, at A4.
189. Spencer Rich, Hill Reaction is Favorable to Nominees, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1971, at
A8.
190. Norman Dorsen, A Response to Mr. Powell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1971, at 45.
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insistence on political conservatism.”191
Despite the indications that his nomination would be relatively
uncontroversial, Powell prepared with his usual meticulousness for his
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee.192 In addition to
discussions of potential financial conflicts of interests, most of the
questions from the members of the committee focused on wiretapping
and other issues related to criminal procedure and the relationship
between individual rights and national security.193 By contrast,
Democratic Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts called on
Powell to explain criticisms that Powell had leveled at Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. during the mid-1960s.194
Powell had outlined the nature of his disagreements with King in a
lecture that was delivered at Washington and Lee University in April,
1966.195 The lecture was, by its terms, a response to King’s celebrated
“Letter From a Birmingham Jail,” in which King declared that “one
has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws” and contended that
the use of civil disobedience was justified as part of the campaign
against racial segregation in the South.196 Powell agreed that people
had a moral right to resist the government in cases where no other
means of redress was available.197 But at the same time, he also
contended that the conditions that might conceivably justify civil
disobedience were not present in the United States of the mid-1960s
and described the advocacy of civil disobedience in that context as “a
heresy which could weaken the foundations of our system of
government, and make impossible the existence of the human
freedoms it strives to protect.”198
Powell acknowledged that “the Negro has had, until recent years,
little reason to respect the law,” that “[t]he entire legal process, from

191. The Court Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1971, at 38.
192. See JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 230.
193. See generally Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell,
Jr. before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 92nd Cong. 201–88 (1971).
194. Id. at 272.
195. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
205, 205 (1966).
196. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail (1963), AFRICAN STUDIES
CENTER – UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/
Letter_Birmingham.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
197. Powell, Jr., supra note 195, at 207–08.
198. Id. at 205. Powell’s speech is also discussed in JEFFRIES, supra note 6, at 238–39, and
Anders Walker, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience: Why Lewis F. Powell Divorced
Diversity From Affirmative Action, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 1229 (2015).
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the police and sheriff to the citizens who serve on juries, has too often
applied a double standard of justice,” and that the situation had been
exacerbated by discriminatory state and local laws, denial of voting
rights, and a general lack of educational and economic opportunities
for African-Americans.199 Nonetheless, he insisted that “in America
today . . . despite some conditions of injustice, wrongs can be and
ultimately are redressed in the courts, the legislatures and through
other established political institutions.”200 Explicitly analogizing the
tactics being employed by the civil rights movements to the efforts of
Southern whites to prevent desegregation through “massive
resistance,” Powell asserted that “if the decision to break the law
really turns on individual conscience, it is hard to see in law how Dr.
King is any better off than former Governor Ross Barnett of
Mississippi, who also believed deeply in his cause and was willing to
go to jail.”201 Similarly, characterizing the decisions of the Supreme
Court overturning the criminal convictions of civil rights
demonstrators who had been engaging in peaceful civil disobedience
as “unwelcome and disturbing precedent[s],”202 Powell argued that
“[i]t would have been wiser public policy, and more consonant with
the rule of law, to require resort to the courts rather than self-help
where public facilities . . . are involved in racial controversy.”203
Powell conceded that, with respect to issues involving race, “civil
disobedience tactics [have] accelerated the pace of legislative
reform.”204 But at the same time, he observed that “the ultimate cost
of this acceleration may be costly indeed—in terms of racial bitterness
and discord, and particularly in the disrespect for law and order
engendered and the lawlessness in the streets which the doctrine of
disobedience has encouraged.”205 Noting that the use of the tactics of
civil disobedience had already been adopted in protests against a
variety of causes that were not directly related to the civil rights
movement, Powell suggested that the increasing acceptance of such
tactics had contributed to the atmosphere which sparked the violent
riots of the mid-1960s and concluded by declaring that “due process

199. Powell, Jr., supra note 195, at 206–07.
200. Id. at 208.
201. Id. at 210 (quoting Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law, 51 VA. L.
REV. 785, 800 (1965)).
202. Id. at 214.
203. Id. at 215.
204. Id. at 217.
205. Id.
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and democratic procedures, even though painfully slow at times, are a
far more dependable and certainly less dangerous means of correcting
injustice and solving social problems.”206
In 1968, after race riots swept the nation during the summers of
1966 and 1967, Powell launched another attack on King’s tactics and
philosophy. In an article published in the New York State Bar Journal,
Powell declared that “once lawlessness is tolerated and justified it
feeds upon itself and leads either to revolution or violent repressive
measures.”207 Powell acknowledged that King had condemned the
riots themselves.208 Nonetheless, observing that King had analogized
the actions of the United States in the Vietnam War to the tactics of
Nazi Germany and had continued to advocate the use of mass
demonstrations for the purpose of “‘dislocating northern cities,”
Powell insisted that King was “arm-in-arm” with the more radical
members of the African-American community who openly advocated
the use of violence to oppose what they characterized as the
fundamental injustices of American society.209
During the mid-1960s, King was a controversial figure, and
criticisms of his tactics were not uncommon.210 However, in the wake
of his assassination in April, 1968—the same month that Powell’s last
attack was published—King became the iconic symbol of the civil
rights movement, and by 1971, any suggestion that a candidate for
high office had a generally unfavorable opinion of King had become
politically toxic.211 Thus, Kennedy’s question at the confirmation
hearing created something of a problem for Powell.
Powell’s response reflected his understanding of the delicacy of
the situation. He began by reiterating the contention that the
acceptance of a general right to civil disobedience was “quite contrary
to the rule of law.”212 But at the same time, he also took care to

206. Id. at 226–28.
207. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Civil Disobedience: Prelude to Revolution?, 40 N.Y. ST. B.J. 172,
173 (1968).
208. Id. at 175.
209. Id.
210. See Jeanne Theoharris, Don’t Forget that Martin Luther King Jr. Was Once Denounced
as an Extremist, TIME, Jan. 12, 2018, online at http://time.com/5099513/martin-luther-king-daymyths/, (last visited April 23, 2019).
211. See Jonah Goldberg, “Like Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Jr. Belongs to the Ages,”
NAT’L REV., April 6, 2018, (“[I]t was King’s tragically premature death that reminded so many
of his historical stature.”) online at https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/martin-luther-kingjr-like-abraham-lincoln/ (last visited April 23, 2019).
212. Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note
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emphasize that he was not disputing the right to take actions designed
to provide the opportunity to challenge unjust rules in court and
declared that King “will be recognized as one of the great leaders of
his people.”213 In addition, Powell observed that he agreed with the
views that had recently been expressed by Kennedy confidante
Archibald Cox, a professor at Harvard Law School and former
Solicitor General of the United States, who had also recently
published an article that questioned a generalized right to civil
disobedience.214 Apparently satisfied with this explanation, Kennedy
quickly moved on to other matters.215
Only Democratic Sen. Birch Bayh of Indiana made any effort to
explore Powell’s role in dealing with the impact of Brown v. Board of
Education on the Richmond school system.216 Observing that many in
Virginia had argued that the public schools should be closed rather
than integrated, and that several Virginia schools had in fact been
closed, Powell responded to Bayh by asserting that the principle task
was to keep the schools open.
217
Noting that the state legislature had essentially mandated that
integration be postponed indefinitely, Powell conceded that the
Richmond schools had not been integrated until ordered to do so by a
federal court.218 Powell then recounted the dispute over the
construction of John Marshall High School, observing that, despite
the public statements that he had made at the time, “it was perfectly
obvious if we built [the high schools] in the locations recommended
by the school board, that they would become integrated in a fairly
short period of time . . . .”219
Bayh then sought to have Powell express his opinion on the
practice of busing students for the purpose of achieving racial
balance.220 Observing that he would undoubtedly be called upon to
decide cases involving busing, Powell would say only that “busing has
been used in public education for many years” and that the question
of whether busing was in the best interest of children and the
23, at 273.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 274.
216. Id. at 277.
217. Id. at 278.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 279.
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educational system would have to be decided on a case by case
basis.221 Similarly, when pressed for his opinion on the constitutional
issues related to inequalities in school finance, Powell stated simply
that “it is a problem which worried us a great deal when I was on the
State board of education primarily because we were more or less
powerless to deal with it.”222
Taken as a whole, the committee’s questioning of Powell was
relatively benign, and nothing in Powell’s answers seemed to pose any
real threat to his confirmation. However, some members of the civil
rights community remained alarmed at the prospect of having Powell
serve on the Court.223 On November 9, Democratic Rep. John
Conyers, Jr. of Michigan, who spoke on behalf of the Congressional
Black Caucus, and Henry L. Marsh III, a Richmond attorney who
represented the all-black Old Dominion Bar Association, appeared
together before the committee and argued that the nomination should
be rejected.224
Conyers and Marsh castigated Powell for his membership in
segregated private clubs, noted that Powell served on the boards of
directors of a number of large corporations that had been charged
with racial discrimination, and asserted that Hunton and Williams,
which had never hired an African-American attorney, in fact had a
policy of not considering African-Americans for positions in the
firm.225 However, their primary focus was on the actions that Powell
had taken as a member of the Richmond School Board and the
Virginia State Board of Education.226 Emphasizing the lack of real
integration of the Richmond public schools during Powell’s tenure,
Conyers and Marsh contended that Powell’s opposition to massive
resistance had been based on tactical rather than principled grounds,
with Conyers declaring that “there were those in Richmond who had
good cause to be justly proud of the masterful way in which Mr.
Powell had perpetuated the antiquated notions of white supremacy
through a clever institutionalization of school segregation”227 and
Marsh asserting that “Mr. Powell had sense enough to recognize the

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 349–92.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.
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futility of the massive resistance program and to go for a more
sophisticated scheme of evading the Brown decision.”228
However, this assessment was disputed by others who had been
involved in the struggle over desegregation of the Virginia schools.
For example, Armistead Boothe, a progressive state legislator who
had been the public face of the opposition to massive resistance,
declared that “the regard for law[] and the farsightedness of a few
people like Lewis Powell . . . helped Virginia . . . to survive the
Commonwealth’s severest test in this century” and asserted that “if
the distinguished members of [the Congressional Black Caucus] could
remember the 1950’s and could get all the available facts . . . [t]hey
would approve of [Powell’s] selection and thank the good Lord they
would have him on the Supreme Court.”229 A number of prominent
African-Americans who had worked with Powell expressed much the
same view. Thus, Booker T. Bradshaw, the only African-American who
had been a member the Richmond School Board in the years
immediately following the decision in Brown, wrote that “[d]uring
that period I did not observe any evidence of racial prejudice on
[Powell’s] part. On the contrary, I always found him to be fair, calm,
and objective in his approach to the many problems that confronted
us.”230 Similarly, Oliver Hill, the civil rights leader who had spoken at
the public meeting dealing with the dispute over the Chandler
conversion, described Powell as “a man whose heart is right.”231
Such statements of support did much to blunt the force of the
Conyers/Marsh assault on the Powell nomination. In addition, the fact
that the Senate had rejected the nominations of Clement Haynsworth
and Harold Carswell in 1970 provided Powell’s supporters with a
tactical advantage. In the wake of the Carswell defeat, Richard Nixon
had asserted bitterly that “it is not possible to get confirmation for the
judge on the Supreme Court of any man who believes in the strict
construction of the Constitution . . . if he happens to come from the
South.”232 Those who had opposed Haynsworth and Carswell had
vehemently denied this charge, claiming instead that the opposition
had been focused on the individual characteristics of the nominees.233
228. Id. at 393.
229. Id. at 126.
230. JEFFRIES, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. supra note 6, at 235.
231. Id.
232. Nixon Won’t Pick 3rd Southerner for High Court, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (April 10,
1970), p. 1.
233. Id.
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The Powell nomination put the latter claim to the test. However
one might have characterized his political views, Powell was plainly an
extraordinarily competent attorney whose ability and temperament
had been lavishly praised by pillars of the legal establishment with a
variety of different intellectual and political perspectives. The
rejection of such a nominee would in essence have confirmed Nixon’s
assessment of the Senate’s attitude toward conservative appointments
from the South.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Powell benefited
greatly from having his nomination being paired with that of William
H. Rehnquist. Rehnquist came to the confirmation process with a
long, documented record of hard-edged support for extremely
conservative positions.234 Whatever flaws progressives might have
seen in Powell’s record, and whatever concerns they might have had
about his nomination, paled in comparison with their alarm at the
prospect of Rehnquist joining the Court.235 Thus, for example,
appearing before the Judiciary Committee on behalf of the NAACP
and the Leadership Council on Civil Rights, Clarence Mitchell and
Joseph L. Rauh explicitly declined to take any position on the Powell
nomination, choosing instead to devote their testimony entirely to an
attack on Rehnquist’s record.236
Against this background, the comments of Conyers and Marsh
had no appreciable impact on the confirmation process. Unlike
Rehnquist, whose confirmation was opposed by four members of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and twenty-six senators on the floor of
the Senate, Powell was confirmed almost unanimously.237 Moreover,
the only senator who cast a negative vote made no reference to
Powell’s record on civil rights, instead characterizing the nominee as
“an elitist [who] has never shown any deep feelings for little
people.”238 Thus, Powell joined the Court on December 7, 1971.
B. Race-Related Jurisprudence
During the fifteen years that he served on the Supreme Court,
Powell was called upon to address a wide variety of race-related
234. See, e.g., The Rehnquist Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, December 8, 1971, p. 36.
235. See, e.g., The Senate, the Court and the Nominees—II, WASH. POST, November 28,
1971, p. C6.
236. Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note
23, at 290.
237. JEFFRIES, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., supra note 6, at 240
238. Id.
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problems. Powell’s analysis of these issues often reflected his belief
that African-Americans and other racial minorities had made great
progress in the years since Brown had been decided. As already noted,
as late as 1966, Powell had acknowledged that “the Negro has had,
until recent years, little reason to respect the law,” that “[t]he entire
legal process from the police and the sheriff, to the citizens who serve
on juries has too often applied a double standard of justice.”239
However, Powell also apparently believed that, by the early 1970s, the
kind of widespread, systemic racial discrimination that had
characterized American society in the pre-Brown era was largely a
thing of the past. While he was willing to concede that individual
African-Americans and members of other racial minority groups
might at times be victims of specific acts of racial discrimination, he
was also firmly convinced that, in most cases, racial minorities could
expect fair treatment from the institutions of government and from
society more generally.
In 1972, this view was clearly reflected in Powell’s reaction to a
broad-based constitutional challenge to the use of the death penalty
in Furman v. Georgia.240 Among other things, those who were
challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment argued that
the manner in which the death penalty was administered
discriminated against African-Americans. In responding to this
argument, Powell expressed a willingness to consider equal protection
challenges to the imposition of the death penalty in specific cases.241
But at the same time, asserting that “[t]he segregation of our society
in decades past, which contributed substantially to the severity of
punishment for interracial crimes, is now no longer prevalent in this
country,” he contended that “[t]he possibility of racial bias in the trial
and sentencing process has diminished in recent years.”242 Similarly,
declaring that “the day is past when juries do not represent the
minority group elements of the community,” Powell insisted that
“[t]he assurance of fair trials for all citizens is greater today than at
any previous time in our history.”243 Thus, he concluded that “because
standards of criminal justice have ‘evolved’ in a manner favorable to

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 450.
Id.
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the accused, discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far
less likely today than in the past.”244
Fifteen years later, in an intraoffice memorandum in McCleskey v.
Kemp,245 Powell reiterated this view even in the face of a statistical
study that concluded that racial issues played a significant role in
determining whether the death penalty was imposed in capital cases.
In the memorandum, noting that in 1976 the Court had imposed new
procedural constraints on the imposition of the death penalty, Powell
observed that “the argument that capital punishment is imposed on a
racially discriminatory basis could well have been made in cases
decided under standardless capital punishment statutes such as those
considered in Furman v. Georgia.”246 But at the same time, he also
asserted that “I . . . think . . . the framework approved by the Court in
[1976] . . . is constitutionally sufficient to prevent racial
discrimination.”247 In addition, maintaining that “it is the jury that is a
criminal defendant’s fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty
against race or color prejudice’,”248 Powell’s published opinion
asserted that “McCleskey’s argument that the Constitution condemns
the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital
sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion
in our criminal justice system.”249 Thus, Powell ultimately found that
“the [statistical] study does not demonstrate a constitutionally
significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process.”250
In McCleskey, Powell spoke for the Court in concluding that the
Georgia procedure did not run afoul of constitutional norms.
Similarly, in cases such as Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,251 Powell generally held the deciding vote in evaluating the
legality of race-conscious affirmative action programs. By contrast,
when dealing with issues related to school desegregation remedies

244. Id.
245. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
246. Memorandum from LFP to Leslie, September 16, 1986, LFP Case File, McCleskey v.
Kemp, No. 84-6811, at 2, archived at http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1350
(last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
247. Id.
248. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 310 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880)).
249. Id. at 311.
250. Id. at 314.
251. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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and voting rights, Powell was often unsuccessful in convincing a
majority of his colleagues to accept his views.
In the school desegregation cases, Powell often focused on what
he viewed as the impropriety of remedial orders that mandated the
busing of large numbers of students for the purpose of improving
racial balance in the public schools. Such orders had proliferated in
the wake of the decision in Swann, where the Court had unanimously
rejected Powell’s argument and held that, in a situation where an
urban school system had previously been segregated by law, an order
which mandated the transportation of a substantial number of
students was entirely appropriate.252 Throughout his tenure as a
justice, Powell sought to narrow the scope of this principle.
In this context, Powell’s opinions reiterated his commitment to the
principle of neighborhood schools and his conviction that the
aggressive pursuit of racial balance should often be subordinated to
this concept. Thus, in 1973, echoing his brief in Swann, Powell’s
opinion in Keyes v. School District No. 1253 asserted that
“[n]eighborhood school systems, neutrally administered, reflect the
deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public
education”254 and observed that “[c]ommunity support, interest, and
dedication to public schools may well run higher with a neighborhood
attendance pattern: distance may encourage disinterest.”255 Seven
years later, his opinion in Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas
NAACP256 was, if anything, even more critical of busing orders,
insisting that “it is increasingly evident that use of the busing remedy
to achieve racial balance can conflict with the goals of equal
educational opportunity and quality schools” and that “[i]n all too
many cities, well-intentioned court decrees have had the primary
effect of stimulating resegregation.”257
Despite such pleas, a majority of the justices who served with
Powell on the Burger Court continued to support the use of busing
orders in a wide variety of circumstances.258 In Milliken v. Bradley,259
252. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
253. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
254. Id. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Id.
256. 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
257. Id. at 438 (Powell, J., dissenting).
258. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
259. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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four of his colleagues did join Powell in concluding that, in the
absence of a showing of an “inter-district violation,” remedial orders
could not require the transportation of students across district lines.
Subject to this limitation, however, at the time that Powell left the
Court in 1987, many urban school districts throughout the country
remained subject to the requirement that students be transported
substantial distances in order to improve the racial balance in public
schools.260
Powell was no less disturbed by the continuing application of the
preclearance requirement of section five of the Voting Rights Act to
the Southern states. In 1973, his displeasure was clearly expressed
during the consideration of Georgia v. United States.261 Georgia did
not come to the Court as a constitutional challenge. Instead, since
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and its progeny had apparently settled
the constitutional issue, the state contended simply that it should
prevail on statutory grounds. However, while almost all of Powell’s
brief published dissent ultimately focused on the statutory issue in
Georgia,262 during the consideration of the case he also challenged the
constitutionality of the preclearance requirement itself.263
In a memorandum to Justice Potter Stewart, Powell insisted that
he would have had no objection to what he described as “a carefully
drawn Voting Rights Act which applied uniformly to all fifty states.”264
Indeed, Powell’s opinion in Georgia asserted that Congress was under
a positive duty to pass legislation that would protect the rights
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.265 Nonetheless, Powell was
convinced that section five itself was unconstitutional.
Unlike Powell’s assessment of the role that racial issues played in
the imposition of the death penalty, his criticism of the preclearance
requirement does not appear to have rested on the premise that
substantial progress in race relations had been made in the postBrown era. Instead, he apparently took the position that the
preclearance requirement had been unconstitutional at the time that
it was enacted in 1965. In his memorandum to Stewart, Powell
260. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
261. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
262. Id. at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting).
263. See infra note 272 and accompanying text.
264. Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, March 30, 1973, Case File Georgia v.
United States, No. 72-75, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 166, Folder 3 (on file, Library of
Congress).
265. Georgia, 411 U.S. at 545 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).

MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN

5/15/2019 10:28 PM

221

complained that the preclearance mandate required states “to go hat
in hand [to] obtain the consent of the Attorney General or run the
gauntlet of the [federal district court for the District of Columbia]
before an act of the state legislature may go into effect.”266 Moreover,
Powell believed that the constitutional problems inherent in section
five had been magnified by decisions such as Matthews, and,
reiterating the view that he had expressed in his 1971 memorandum
on the Chesterfield annexation, complained to Stewart that the
application of the Voting Rights Act to annexation decisions “does
grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities.”267
Powell was also extremely displeased by the fact that a handful of
Southern states had been singled out for unfavorable treatment by
section five. Powell conceded that, historically, African-Americans
who sought to vote in the South had often faced greater difficulties
than their counterparts in other areas of the country.268 Thus, an early
draft of his opinion in Georgia explicitly acknowledged the fact that
“various means, both overt and subtle, have been employed to deny
voting rights on racial grounds, and these indefensible practices have
been more prevalent in some states and sections of our country than
in others.”269 But the same unpublished draft also observed that, as
interpreted by cases such as Allen and Perkins, “section 5 . . . appl[ies]
to conduct which is common to all of the states” and that “these
commonplace changes, often essential to meet neutral and nonracial
needs, are not unique to the few states targeted by this discriminatory
legislation. They are as national in usage as state and local
government itself.”270 In short, as he observed in the memorandum to
Stewart, Powell viewed section five as “discriminatory and
indefensible sectional rather than national legislation.”271
Ultimately, Powell decided against using Georgia as a vehicle to
make a detailed argument against the constitutionality of the
preclearance requirement. Instead, in his published opinion, he
contented himself with the simple observation that “[i]t is indeed a
serious intrusion, incompatible with the basic structure of our system,
for federal authorities to compel a State to submit its legislation for
266. Mar. 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264.
267. Id.
268. Draft opinion, April 2, 1973, LFP Case Files, Georgia v. United States, No. 72-75, at 3
(archived online at http://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=1602).
269. Id. at 5.
270. Id.
271. Mar. 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264.
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advance review” and the assertion that this requirement was
“rendered the more noxious by its selective application to only a few
States.”272 However, seven years later, after Congress had voted in
1975 to once again extend the life of the preclearance requirement,
Powell publicly assailed the constitutionality of the application of
section five to a Southern municipality in City of Rome v. United
States.273
City of Rome came to the Court after the municipal government
of the city of Rome, Georgia, had unsuccessfully sought preclearance
for a number of annexations and changes in the manner that its City
Commission and Board of Education were chosen. Following the
denial of the preclearance request, the city sought to take advantage
of the so-called “bailout” procedure that had been incorporated into
the Voting Rights Act. By its terms, the bailout provision provided
that a covered “State” could be relieved of the preclearance mandate
if the state could demonstrate that no test or other device had been
used in the jurisdiction within the past seventeen years “for the
purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color.”274 The city argued that it was entitled to
avail itself of the bailout provision because the city itself had not
engaged in any discriminatory practices for the requisite period,
notwithstanding the fact that the state of Georgia as a whole had not
satisfied the requirements established by the statute. In addition to its
statutory arguments, the city government also contended that in this
context, Congress could not constitutionally require the city to obtain
preclearance before taking the proposed actions.
Speaking for the Court, Thurgood Marshall showed no sympathy
for these arguments. In rejecting the constitutional challenge, the
majority opinion emphasized the long history of racial discrimination
in the South, noting that, in 1965—a full ninety-five years after the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment—Congress had determined
that “racial discrimination in voting was an ‘insidious and pervasive
evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country
through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution’”275

272. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
273. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
274. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1973b(a)
275. Georgia v. United , 411 U.S. at 181–82 (emphasis in original) (quoting South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966)).

MALTZ_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN

5/15/2019 10:28 PM

223

and asserting that “in adopting the Voting Rights Act, Congress
sought to remedy this century of obstruction by shifting ‘the
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its
victims.’”276 Turning specifically to the decision to extend the
preclearance requirement in 1975, Marshall noted that “[t]en years
later, Congress found that a 7-year extension of the Act was necessary
to preserve the ‘limited and fragile’ achievements of the Act and to
promote further amelioration of voting discrimination”277 and
concluded that “[w]hen viewed in this light, Congress’ considered
determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were
necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting
discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable.”278
Not surprisingly, Powell viewed the extension of the preclearance
requirement quite differently. In the interim between Georgia and
City of Rome, Powell had reluctantly concurred in a number of
expansive interpretations of the preclearance requirement, reasoning
that the results were compelled by the logic of decisions such as
Perkins.279 However, he was unwilling to countenance the imposition
of the preclearance requirement in City of Rome, fuming privately
that “this intrusion on the right of cities & states to determine their
own local gov’t structure . . . is indefensible as applied only to selected
states and now has continued long after blacks vote freely throughout
the South,”280 and expressing the belief that African-Americans would
be able to use their newly-acquired political power to prevent state
officials from instituting racially-discriminatory measures.281
Moreover, to Powell, the specific facts of City of Rome provided a
classic example of what he characterized as the “absurdities” of
section five. Among other things, the Attorney General had refused to
preclear thirteen proposed annexations. Nine of the thirteen cases
involved vacant land, while taken together the remaining annexations
would have resulted in a net decline of a total of one percent in the
African-American share of the electorate in Rome. Against this

276. Id. at 182 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966)).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., United States v. Bd. of Comm’rs. of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 139–40 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
280. Handwritten Notes on Memorandum from David to LFP, September 17, 1979, LFP
Case File, City of Rome v. United States, no. 78-7840 at 1 online at https://scholarlycommons.law
.wlu.edu/casefiles/259/, (last visited April 23, 2019).
281. Id. at 6.
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background, Powell argued not only that the Voting Rights Act by its
terms allowed the city of Rome to be considered independently for
purposes of the bailout provision, but also that it had been
unconstitutional for the district court to refuse to allow the city to
take advantage of that provision.
Powell began his dissenting opinion in City of Rome by observing
that even the majority in South Carolina v. Katzenbach had
recognized that the preclearance provision was “an uncommon
exercise of congressional power.” He argued that section five was
“especially troubling because it destroys local control of the means of
self-government,”282 which Powell described as “one of the central
values of our polity.”283 Nonetheless, Powell’s City of Rome dissent did
not explicitly address the broader question of whether Congress had
exceeded its constitutional authority by extending the life of the
preclearance requirement in 1975. Instead, he focused specifically on
the situation in which local governments found themselves in states
such as Georgia.
Powell asserted that “[u]nless the federal structure provides some
protection for a community’s ordering of its own democratic
procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course
within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at risk.”284
Observing that only the need to remedy violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment justified the preclearance requirement’s intrusion on the
right to self-government, Powell contended that any such broad based
requirement ran the risk of burdening jurisdictions that had not in
fact been guilty of racial discrimination and insisted that only the
existence of a bailout procedure made this possibility tolerable.285 He
also noted that a regime that made the procedure available only when
an entire state could demonstrate that it had been free from racially
discriminatory voting practices for seventeen years in essence “makes
every city and county in Georgia a hostage to the errors, or even the
deliberate intransigence, of a single subdivision.” Against this
background, Powell concluded that the preclearance requirement
could pass constitutional muster only if individual subdivisions were

282.
283.
284.
285.

City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 201 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 201–02.
Id. at 202–03.
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entitled to avail themselves of the bailout procedure based solely on
local conditions.286
In one important respect, Powell’s proposed treatment of section
five differed radically from the courses of action that he championed
in cases such as McCleskey and Keyes. In McCleskey and Keyes,
Powell advocated judicial restraint. By contrast, in Georgia and City of
Rome, he took the position that the Court should act aggressively to
rein in legislative action that threatened what Powell viewed as
fundamental precepts of the American political system. Nonetheless,
his opinions in all of these cases are connected by a common theme:
the view that systemic problems of racism had largely disappeared,
and that any remaining issues should be addressed in a manner that
did not unduly disrupt existing institutional structures.
However, Powell had only limited success in convincing a majority
of his colleagues to embrace this perspective. As already noted, when
Powell left the Court in 1987, many jurisdictions remained subject to
judicial decrees requiring widespread transportation of students in
order to improve the racial balance of public schools. Moreover, the
Court’s failure to condemn the preclearance requirement had left
Powell’s native Virginia and a number of other Southern states
subject to the strictures of section five of the Voting Rights Act. Thus,
Powell could not have been satisfied with the state of the law dealing
with these issues at the time that he left the Court. By contrast, he
would have been more pleased with the evolution of the doctrines
relating to both school desegregation and the Voting Rights Act
during the period between the time of his retirement and the present
day.
IV. THE TRIUMPH OF THE SOUTHERN MAN
A. School Desegregation
The Court’s approach to the issues of remedies in school
desegregation cases began to change soon after Powell was replaced
by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in 1987. The pivotal moment came in
1991 with the decision in Oklahoma City Board of Education v.
Dowell.287 Dowell arose from the efforts of the Oklahoma City Board
of Education to free itself from the constraints of a desegregation

286. See id. at 203.
287. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
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injunction that had been issued by a federal district court in 1972.
Under the terms of that injunction, the Board of Education was
required to follow the terms of the so-called “Finger Plan,” which
required the transportation of large numbers of students in order to
improve racial balance in the public elementary and secondary
schools in Oklahoma City. After following the dictates of the Finger
Plan for more than a decade, the Board of Education argued that the
school system had achieved unitary status, and that the board should
be allowed to implement the terms of a Student Reassignment Plan
[hereinafter SRP] under which the Finger Plan would continue to
govern the assignment of students in middle school and high school,
but elementary school students would be assigned to their
neighborhood schools.
Because of residential segregation, adherence to the SRP was
certain to dramatically reduce the degree of racial balance in the
Oklahoma City schools. Under the terms of the plan, of the sixty-four
elementary schools in the system, eleven would be over ninety
percent African-American, while the student population of twentytwo schools would be less than ten percent African-American.
Nonetheless, the district court concluded that the Board of Education
should be allowed to implement the SRP, finding that the Oklahoma
City school district had achieved unitary status by faithfully
complying with the terms of the 1972 order, that the SRP had not
been intentionally designed to increase racial segregation, and that
the 1972 injunction should be dissolved. However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the 1972
injunction should remain in place absent “dramatic changes in
conditions unforeseen at the time of the decree that . . . impose
extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the [Board of
Education]” and that Oklahoma City remained under an obligation
“not to take any action that would impede the process of disestablishing
the dual system and its effects.”288
When Dowell came before the Supreme Court, a majority of the
justices concluded that the judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted
that “[t]he test espoused by the Court of Appeals would condemn a
school district, once governed by a board which intentionally
discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future” and

288. Id. at 244 (quoting Dayton Bd. Of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979)).
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declared that “[n]either the principles governing the entry and
dissolution of injunctive decrees, nor the commands of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require any such
Draconian result.”289 While conceding that “a district court need not
accept at face value the profession of a school board which has
intentionally discriminated that it will cease to do so in the future,”
Rehnquist also observed that “in deciding whether to modify or
dissolve a desegregation decree, a school board’s compliance with
previous court orders is obviously relevant,” noting that “the . . .
passage of time [between the time that the original decree was
entered and 1985] enables the district court to observe the good faith
of the school board in complying with the decree.”290
Rehnquist did not explicitly reinstate the judgment dissolving the
1972 injunction. Instead, he concluded that the district court should be
instructed to determine whether the school board had made a
“sufficient showing of constitutional compliance” to allow judicial
supervision to be terminated and also whether the decision to adopt
the SRP had in fact been tainted by racial considerations.291
Nonetheless, the majority opinion in Dowell clearly implied that, once
a school board had faithfully observed the terms of a desegregation
decree for a significant period of time, the board should be freed from
the supervision of the federal courts, subject only to the proviso that
race should not play a role in determining the policies adopted to
govern educational affairs.
Any doubts that might have remained regarding the change in the
Court’s attitude toward desegregation orders were dispelled the
following year by the decision in Freeman v. Pitts.292 Freeman involved
a dispute over the status of the school system in Dekalb County,
Georgia, which had been subject to federal court supervision since
1969 under a consent decree that required the local authorities to
replace the segregated system that had formerly been maintained in
Dekalb County with an approach designed to create a unitary system.
In 1986, in response to a petition to dissolve the consent decree, the
district court found that, while the school system had not achieved
unitary status in all respects, with respect to student assignments the
school system had been “effectively desegregated” for a period of
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 249–250.
503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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time,293 and that subsequent changes in racial balance were the result
of demographic changes for which the school authorities bore no
responsibility.294
Against this background, the Freeman Court held that “federal
courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of
school districts in incremental stages, before full compliance has been
achieved in every area of school operations”295 and in particular that
“the district court may determine that it will not order further
remedies in the area of student assignments where racial imbalance is
not traceable, in a proximate way, to constitutional violations.”296
Focusing on a theme that had often been emphasized by Justice
Powell, the opinion of the Court declared that “[r]eturning schools to
the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is
essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental
system”297 and that “[w]hen the school district and all state entities
participating with it in operating the schools make decisions in the
absence of judicial supervision, they can be held accountable to the
citizenry, to the political process, and to the courts in the ordinary
course.”298
By setting the stage for the end of judicial decrees mandating
widespread transportation of children for the purpose of achieving
racial balance, Dowell and Freeman in effect embraced the
perspective that had been taken by Justice Powell throughout his
career on the Court. Within two decades, over half of all the school
districts that had been subject to court-ordered desegregation plans
had been released from judicial supervision, in many cases paving the
way for a return to the kind of neighborhood-based school
assignment policies that Powell had so vigorously championed.299
Thus, the era of extensive court-ordered school busing had effectively
come to an end.

293. Id. at 477.
294. Id. at 494.
295. Id. at 490.
296. Id. at 491.
297. Id. at 490.
298. Id.
299. Sean F. Reardon, Elena Tej Grewal, Demetra Kalogrides & Erica Greenberg,
“Brown” Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the Resegregation of
American Public Schools, 31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876, 877 (2012).
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B. The Death of the Preclearance Requirement
Powell would have been equally pleased by the ultimate demise of
the preclearance requirement of the Voting Rights Act. After he left
the Court in 1987, the preclearance requirement was reauthorized for
fifteen years in 1992 and for an additional twenty-five years in 2006.
The 2006 Reauthorization Act also overruled two Supreme Court
decisions that had made it easier for covered jurisdictions to obtain
preclearance for changes in election procedures.300
Despite these reaffirmations by Congress, the concept of
preclearance continued to be the subject of constitutional challenges
in the late twentieth century.301 However, it was not until 2009 that a
majority of the justices first indicated that they had serious doubts
about the constitutionality of the 2006 extension.302 While the Court
did not definitively resolve the constitutional issue at that time, four
years later, the five most conservative members of the Court explicitly
concluded that the extension was unconstitutional in Shelby County v.
Holder.303
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts reiterated
the standard characterization of the preclearance requirement as
“‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal
system’”304 that constituted an “‘extraordinary departure from the
traditional course of relations between the States and the Federal
Government’.”305 In addition, he contended that the decision to
impose the requirement on some but not all state governments ran
afoul of the principle that “all the States enjoy equal sovereignty”306
and that any departure from this principle required a showing that the
disparate treatment of the states was “sufficiently related to the
problem that it targets.”307

300. The two decisions were Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003), which held that a
plan could be precleared even if it reduced minority voters’ ability to elect their preferred
representatives, as long as it preserved the “opportunity to participate in the political process,”
and Reno v. Bossier Parrish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000), which held that section five barred
preclearance only for changes that were designed to worsen the existing position of minority
voters.
301. See, e.g., Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
302. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
303. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
304. Id. at 545 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 211).
305. Id. (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–501 (1992)).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 542 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S. at 203).
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Roberts conceded that in 1965, both the imposition of the
preclearance requirement itself and the content of the formula that
determined which jurisdictions would be subject to the requirement
were justified by the conditions which existed at the time.308 At the
same time, however, the opinion also cited a variety of evidence that
in Roberts’s view demonstrated that African-Americans in the
Southern states had far greater opportunity to participate in the
political process than the statistics from the 1960s and 1970s would
suggest.309 Thus, insisting that the 2006 extension “imposes current
burdens and must be justified by current needs,”310 Roberts concluded
that the original coverage formula could no longer be used to identify
the states that would be required to preclear changes in the electoral
process, and that, in the absence of the adoption of a formula that
more accurately reflected the realities of the early twenty-first
century, Congress could not constitutionally subject a small group of
states to the preclearance requirement.
The majority opinion in Shelby County thus embraced two of the
most important aspects of Justice Powell’s worldview. First, the
decision was based on the theory that the Southern states were being
unfairly singled out for less favorable treatment that was not justified
by empirical evidence. In addition, Chief Justice Roberts seems to
have shared Powell’s conviction that racism was no longer endemic in
the United States and that specific instances of racial discrimination
could be adequately addressed without unduly disrupting the
traditional structure of governmental institutions. The majority
opinion acknowledged that, at the time that the Voting Rights Act was
passed in 1965, the preclearance requirement had been imposed on
the Southern states because Congress had determined that “[c]ase-bycase litigation had proved inadequate to prevent . . . racial
discrimination in voting [in those states].”311 Roberts also conceded
that “voting discrimination still exists”312 and declared that “any racial
discrimination in voting is too much.”313 But at the same time, he
insisted that “our Nation has made great strides [in providing AfricanAmericans with access to political power]”314 and, by invalidating
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 545–46.
Id. at 547–48.
Id. at 542 (quoting Nw. Austin, 557 U.S., at 203).
Id. at 545.
Id. at 536.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 549.
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section five, implicitly suggested that the standard modes of judicial
action could provide a sufficient remedy for any further instances of
racial discrimination in the political process. In short, much like
Powell before him, Roberts chose to emphasize the progress that had
been made in race relations rather than the challenges that remained
to be addressed.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Lewis Powell would no doubt have been greatly pleased
by the tenor of the majority opinion in Shelby County, the opinion did
not completely vindicate Powell’s view of the state of race relations at
the time that he joined the Court. In effectively striking down the
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, Chief Justice Roberts
focused on the political power available to African-Americans in the
early twenty-first century—a power that was on display, for example,
in recent statewide elections in Virginia and Alabama, where the
African-American vote played a crucial role by providing the margin
of victory for Democratic candidates whose opponents received a
substantial majority of white votes.315 However, the situation in the
South was very different in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when
Powell often asserted that systemic racial discrimination was already a
thing of the past and bitterly described section five as “discriminatory
and indefensible sectional rather than national legislation” that “does
grievous harm to the orderly development of urban communities [in
the South].”316
Nonetheless, even if one accepts Roberts’ assessment of the
current situation with respect to voting rights, the ongoing impact of
systemic racial discrimination continues to be apparent in other
contexts in which Powell expressed confidence in the ability of
existing institutions to treat African-Americans fairly. For example,
although white students are now significantly less likely to attend
highly segregated schools than in the years before Dowell, the period
between 1988 and 2013 witnessed a steady rise in the percentage of
students of color who attend public schools that have few white
315. See Exit Poll Results: How Different Groups of Virginians Voted, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/virginia-politics/governor-exitpolls/?utm_term=.fea4e293a735 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (detailing Virginia voting polls);
Summer Meza, Who Voted For Doug Jones? White Women Backed Roy Moore, NEWSWEEK,
http://www.newsweek.com/doug-jones-roy-moore-alabama-senate-race-special-election-resultsdemographics-746366 (last visited Mar. 31, 2019) (detailing Alabama voting polls).
316. March 30 Memorandum from LFP to Potter Stewart, supra note 264.
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students,317 despite research suggesting that children of color are more
likely to succeed academically in racially-integrated settings.318
Similarly, people of color remain far more likely than whites to be
subjected to capital punishment,319 and the race of the victim
continues to be a significant factor in determining whether a
particular defendant is sentenced to die for a crime.320
Of course, the fact that such problems continue to exist does not
by its terms determine the appropriate role of the judiciary in dealing
with these issues. One might, for example, take the view that the
underperformance by children of color in urban schools is best
addressed through measures designed to improve the quality of those
schools rather than the transportation of the students to schools that
are outside of their neighborhoods. But no one can plausibly suggest,
as Lewis Powell did more than forty years ago, that widespread
segregation and racial inequality are no longer problems in the
United States, and the analysis of constitutional issues should reflect
this reality.

317. Gary Orfield, Jongyeon Ee, Erika Frankenberg, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Brown
at 62: School Segregation by Race, Poverty and State, UCLA: THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 2
(2016), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5ds6k0rd (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
318. Ethnic and Racial Disparities in Education: Psychology’s Contributions to
Understanding and Reducing Disparities, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 58–61
(2012),
https://www.scribd.com/document/142923734/Ethnic-and-Racial-Disparities-inEducation (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
319. Race and the Death Penalty, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/other/race-and-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 31, 2019).
320. Id.

